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USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology

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Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Stability

18030001a Moscow *SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA* in Russian No 9, Sep 87 (signed to press 20 Aug 87) pp 3-13

[First installment of article by A.G. Arbatov, A.A. Vasil'yev, and A.A. Kokoshin]

[Text] Stability, or a stable military and strategic balance, became one of the central issues in international relations in the 1980's. The realization of the importance of strengthening strategic stability made this task part of the efforts to limit and reduce arms and to achieve nuclear disarmament. It is recorded in a number of Soviet-American documents of major importance.

As V.V. Zhurkin correctly points out, "the irrefutable fact that nuclear war will mean the end of human history made the problem of the stability of the strategic situation one of the central issues in contemporary political and military thinking. The concept of stability has positive psychological implications and inspires confidence in the lasting power of peace."¹

When the term "stability" is applied to the military-strategic balance, the invariability of which is the most important condition for international security, it primarily means the degree of probability of nuclear war with the given balance of power. Besides this, the stability of this balance depends on the parameters determining how easy it is for one side to tip the balance and achieve superiority and how difficult it is for the other side to neutralize these moves and restore parity. Finally, another aspect of stability is connected with the degree to which the strategic balance of power and its concrete military-technical characteristics can conform to arms reduction and limitation measures negotiated by the sides. Both the arrival at compromises during negotiations and the possibility of verifying the observance of agreements depend on the stability of the military balance.

The primary significance of the stability of the military balance is reflected in the degree of probability of the exchange of nuclear strikes in a given conflict. The political preconditions of the conflict were and are determining factors: the intensity of clashes between

powers, the possibility of settling them peacefully, the political stakes involved, and their comparability to probable losses in the event of retreat or armed confrontation.

Today the price of the possible growth of any kind of international political crisis into a global military confrontation is much higher—and not only for the opposing sides, but also for the whole world. At the same time, military-strategic calculations now have a stronger influence on crises in various parts of the world where the USSR and the United States or their closest allies are in confrontation. The assessment of the state of the military balance, strategic capabilities, and intentions of the sides in this kind of situation could dictate restraint in the use of arms, including nuclear weapons, or, on the contrary, could encourage one side to cross the fatal line in the expectation of a sudden victory, in the hope of seizing the strategic initiative, or in the fear that the opponent will take this step.

At the highest level of the military balance, the level of nuclear missiles, the deciding influence on stability is exerted, on the one hand, by the military programs of the USSR and the United States, military doctrines, and strategic and tactical forms of using nuclear weapons and, on the other, by the talks and agreements of the great powers on arms limitation and reduction and on the reduction of the probability of military confrontations. The nuclear arms race has become a serious source of hostility, mistrust, and political tension, and these are making any regional conflict more severe and more dangerous and the positions of the sides more irreconcilable; they make the use of force easier. At the same time, the arms limitation and reduction agreements—in addition to their direct effect on the military balance of power, including the degree of its stability—are promoting the relaxation of tension and the search for mutually acceptable ways of settling regional conflicts peacefully.

The contemporary military-strategic balance is a way of expressing the relative qualitative and quantitative properties of the forces of the opposing sides and the factors determining the strategic situation. It can be seen as a dynamic macrosystem, with nuclear arms, primarily strategic offensive weapons, as its main element. Besides this, the conventional armed forces and arms of the sides, which have once again displayed accelerated development in recent years, have a significant effect on the stability of this balance, especially under the conditions of a "nuclear stalemate." The system also includes the material and technical resources, establishments, and institutions of the opposing sides with some influence on the possibility of starting or averting a nuclear conflict.

The dynamics of the development of the military-strategic balance macrosystem depend primarily on political and socioeconomic factors. In addition, however, an important role is played by the close connection between

the individual offensive weapons of the sides and between means of attack and defense—a connection between the opposing sides and within the armed forces of each side.²

In a discussion of the influence of the latest technical inventions on military affairs, F. Engels stressed that they introduce periodic changes into tactics and strategy and influence the political goals of the states at war and the scales of the wars themselves. He discussed the competition between means of attack and defense at length.³

In World War I, for example, defense turned out to be stronger than offense, and troop movements acquired a primarily positional nature. During the period between the world wars there was a vigorous search for ways of surmounting the situation in which defense prevails over offense. And they were found. Means of penetration and exploitation were used widely in World War II: tanks, self-propelled artillery, aviation, submarines, and aircraft carriers, and this gave military operations an active and offensive nature from the very beginning. Tactical breakthroughs immediately developed into operational penetration. Offensive weapons turned out to be stronger than defenses.⁴ For this reason, defensive arms (antitank artillery, antitank mines, antitank guided missiles, various types of missile complexes, fighter aviation, antisubmarine vessels, etc.) were energetically developed during the war and especially after the war. Their skillful use during a particular phase did much to balance means of offense and defense.⁵

A qualitatively new situation took shape in the nuclear sphere, where the colossal leap in the absolute predominance of offensive weapons over defenses was accomplished by the very appearance of this weapon of mass destruction with unprecedented and unselective, absolute destructive force and colossal and almost insurmountable secondary consequences of its use, to the point of the most catastrophic effects on all life on earth. This was and is the main feature of the global military-political situation in the foreseeable future. As a result, the military-strategic balance or parity between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO cannot be reduced to the approximate quantitative equality of the sides under the conditions of the existence of nuclear weapons. The colossal destructive force of these weapons does much to nullify differences in the sizes of the sides' arsenals and in the technical characteristics of the various components of their offensive forces. In other words, the military-strategic balance has a considerable dynamic range.⁶ The existence of this range and a realization of its scales establish important conditions for nuclear arms limitation and reduction talks and for the planning of bold and flexible approaches to the wording of agreements.

But is the nuclear weapon an exception to the rule of the alternating prevalence of the "shield" and the "sword"? This is far from a purely academic question. Today it is

known to be the object of intense speculation by those who talk about the possibility of protection from nuclear weapons by means of the deployment of broad-scale antimissile defenses with various space-based attack weapons as their elements—a fundamentally new class of armaments.

It appears that nuclear weapons are not an exception to the rule of competition between offense and defense, although their special properties give this competition clearly distinctive forms. It must be said that even in the past offense and defense were usually not present in the abstract and pure form, but in relative categories, depending on the "system of coordinates" applying to specific situations. For example, the shield would seem to be the classic means of defense, but the shield and armor of the medieval knights were an integral attribute of this prevailing offensive force in the Middle Ages. Artillery is an even more ambiguous type of weapon. From the tactical standpoint, it was a means of defense in the protection of fortresses, but it was used as an offensive weapon when these same fortresses were attacked and, in fact, it was precisely artillery that put an end to the impregnability of stone fortress walls. It is equally important to consider the distinctive features of the interaction of offense and defense in confrontations between the armed forces of states, on the one hand, and the effects of the use of weapons systems on the civilian population, on the other. Even a prevalence of defense (as in World War I, for example) did not mean the protection of the population and often resulted in colossal destruction and losses for the population (as in the battle on the Marne). The use of nuclear weapons, the most devastating means of mass destruction, created and first used by the United States in Japan against the civilian population, always threatens horrifying losses for the civilian population and the physical property of states.

Nuclear weapons have always been primarily offensive from the technical and tactical standpoints (the only exceptions are the nuclear-powered interceptor-missiles in missile and air defense and nuclear mines). In this sphere the competition between offense and defense is a competition between the destructive force and accuracy of nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and the enhancement of their survivability (including early warning, command, control, and communication systems) on the other. In the second case this means, for instance, the enhancement of the durability of missile silos, the enhancement of the invulnerability of missiles with the use of mobile launchers, the concealment of missile-carrying submarines, and the rate of climb and security of bombers. Comparatively effective systems for the active defense of offensive weapons can also be created—for example, ABM complexes for the protection of silos, command points, and other installations.

In contrast to the technical and tactical aspects of the matter, the strategic aspect of the competition between offense and defense in the sphere of nuclear weapons

usually appears to take the form of changes in the relative ability of nations to deliver first and retaliatory strikes.

It is an indisputable fact that the creation of nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems had a revolutionizing effect on the science and art of warfare and on traditional strategic thinking—an even greater impact than the invention of fire-arms. As military theorists pointed out long ago, one of the decisive innovations in this area was the possibility of destroying things of vital importance and value to a state—its population, its economic potential, its administrative bodies—before or instead of destroying its armed forces.⁷

When the United States lost its nuclear monopoly, however, the armed forces of the other side also had a chance to destroy the adversary's vitally important centers instead of its armed forces. This supplemented the earlier function of direct combat with the adversary's army and navy for the protection of the side's own people and state. The traditional situation was restored between the nuclear powers, but in fundamentally new forms: Without destroying the armed forces of the other side, primarily its nuclear weapons, its population and economy cannot be destroyed or taken over—and not because they are protected directly by troops but because troops are capable of retaliating by devastating the aggressor's territory with nuclear missiles "over the heads" of the army and navy. Successful attack and victory are impossible if the aggressor cannot prevent nuclear retaliation or at least reduce its force to an acceptable level.⁸ This is why the effectiveness of attack is measured primarily in terms of its ability to destroy the other side's nuclear weapons and the systems of their command and control in the absolute and relative respects. The strength of defenses, in turn, is reflected in the ability of strategic weapons to survive even a surprise attack and deliver a devastating retaliatory strike. This is the main factor of defense in the balance of the sides' nuclear forces, in which defenses take the form of the potential to deter an attack by a probable aggressor, and not the traditional form of the literal repulsion of attack.

The balance of USSR and U.S. nuclear forces can also be viewed from this standpoint. From the end of the 1950's to the middle of the 1960's, under the conditions of substantial American military superiority, the prevalence of strategic offense over defense was obviously quite high. The plans of the U.S. Strategic Air Command to put most Soviet strategic nuclear weapons out of commission with a first strike were reflected in the strategic concepts of "counterforce" and "limited damage" and in U.S. operational plans (SIOP-2 and SIOP-3); this was the reason for the instability of the military balance and, consequently, the high level of political tension of those years and the greater probability of nuclear war. Furthermore, the instability posed an objective threat to the United States' own interests, in spite of its military superiority. The more farsighted American politicians and specialists (J. Kennedy, M. Bundy, J.

Wiesner, and R. McNamara) were already realizing even then that the American potential for a disarming first strike would give the other side a strong incentive to take preventive steps, which would be catastrophic for the United States in spite of its strategic superiority.

In the second half of the 1960's the Soviet Union was able to stabilize the military situation by taking counter-measures to strengthen its own strategic potential. Throughout the 1970's the enhancement of the viability of nuclear weapons and the combined effects of other military-technical tendencies on the overall USSR-U.S. military balance under the conditions of the approximate quantitative parity recorded in the SALT-I accords and then in SALT-II, considerably increased the mutual capabilities of the powers for retaliation. Of course, in a sphere as multifaceted as the strategic balance, no tendency exists in its pure form. The compounding of the number of nuclear warheads in the strategic forces of the two states, the development of new weapons systems, and the advancement of some destabilizing concepts by the United States, such as "limited nuclear war," had an exasperating effect on the stability of the nuclear balance.

In general, however, the physical parameters of parity and the strategic weapons actually deployed by the sides indicate the considerable enhancement of the stability of the military-strategic balance at that time. Although the nuclear weapons of the two powers remained strictly offensive in the technical and operational respects, from the end of the 1960's to the beginning of the 1980's they were part of an overall strategic balance in which defense clearly surpassed offense. Of course, this was not reflected in the traditional forms of the strategic balance, but in the abovementioned fundamentally new forms, corresponding to the unprecedented revolutionizing effects of nuclear missiles on the science, strategy, and policy of warfare.

By the middle of the 1980's several parameters of the strategic balance reflected a clear tendency toward instability. It is true that the stockpiles of nuclear weapons capable of surviving a surprise attack and delivering a retaliatory strike have continued to grow primarily as a result of an absolute increase in nuclear arms, including their more invulnerable (naval, in particular) categories. This has been accompanied by a relative increase in the number of arms adapted and intended for highly accurate strikes against the strategic weapons of the other side. The American MX, Trident-2, Midgetman, and B-1B systems and various cruise missiles will be capable of increasing the overall counterforce potential of the United States (primarily for the destruction of the other side's fortified objects on land) in the middle of the 1990's to from three to six times its potential of the early 1980's. The portion of this potential which was distinguished by high survivability from the very beginning will increase more than 4-fold, and the portion capable of reaching targets quickly (within 30 minutes or less) will increase 20-fold.⁹

Understandably, given the huge strategic arsenals of the present day, these programs will not give the United States the potential for a disarming first strike or even counterforce potential in relation to Soviet deterrents comparable to the first half of the 1960's. There is no question that the USSR's countermeasures will envisage the expansion of the less vulnerable and highly survivable elements of its strategic forces. The absolute and relative increase in counterforce weapons or weapons more vulnerable to a counterforce strike in the overall military balance of the two powers, however, should be regarded as a destabilizing tendency, representing a relative increase in the functions of nuclear offense at the expense of nuclear defense.

As for defense in the traditional sense of the term, the possibility of creating absolutely reliable means of protecting the population from nuclear weapons, especially ballistic missiles, is even theoretically completely excluded. The creation of absolutely impenetrable antimissile defenses for the territory of a country is just as improbable as the invention of a perpetual engine. Even the most zealous supporters of the SDI in the United States now acknowledge the infeasibility of this system.

Missile and air defense systems of limited effectiveness for the protection of strategic offensive arms and other military objects can be created in principle, but in the presence of sufficiently viable offensive arms these defensive systems are still not needed to protect them from a hypothetical pre-emptive strike.

A much larger, technically complex, and extremely costly antimissile system with direct or indirect potential for the protection of administrative and industrial centers of less than 100-percent effectiveness (for instance, with interception effectiveness of 40-60 percent) would be completely useless as a means of repulsing a full-scale first nuclear strike against these targets. "Just" 10 percent of the present strategic forces of each side represents around 1,000 nuclear projectiles, while from 25 to 30 percent of the population and up to 70 percent of the industrial facilities of each side are concentrated in only around 200 administrative and industrial centers. The penetration of defenses by around 400 warheads of approximately megaton force would be enough for their complete devastation. Even a partially effective antimissile system, however, can give the state possessing it the dangerous illusion of the possibility of warding off a less powerful retaliatory strike by the other side after it has been weakened and disoriented by a sudden nuclear attack on its strategic forces and their command, control, and communications system.

The dialectics of the nuclear balance therefore put both offensive and defensive arms in an absolutely new light by radically changing their traditional role in the relationship between offense and defense. Broad-scale ABM systems could destabilize the strategic balance dramatically. Without these systems, the stability of the relative offensive nuclear forces of the sides in the presence of

overall parity is augmented by the decline of the probable aggressor's ability to use a first strike to weaken the force of retaliation on absolute and relative scales or, in other words, by the enhancement of the reliability of the potential of each power for an adequate retaliatory strike. Stability presupposes the symmetrical and mutual confidence of both powers in the reliability of their deterrence potential, and at the lowest possible levels of lethal arsenals, which can be reduced in principle to the minimal level of reasonable sufficiency, dictated at each specific phase by the distinctive features of the military-technical and political situation.

The existence of a military-strategic balance, or parity, reflected in the quantitative and qualitative features of the nuclear forces of the opposing sides, is one of the main factors determining strategic stability. In other words, strategic stability would be lessened by a large imbalance—for example, in the quantity of strategic weapons—in favor of one side. Even if this advantage would not give it the ability to reduce the force of the opponent's retaliatory strike, it would urge the other side to take countermeasures, would escalate the arms race, and would complicate agreements to curb it.

At the same time, the maintenance of the overall military-strategic balance or parity cannot secure sufficient strategic stability in itself. "The higher the level of military confrontation rises in the nuclear-space age," E.A. Shevardnadze said when he addressed the 40th session of the UN General Assembly, "the more tenuous and less reliable the foundations of international peace become—even if strategic parity is maintained."¹⁰

One of the main conditions of a stable military-strategic balance is the presence of guaranteed potential on both sides for an adequate retaliatory strike. For this reason, strategic stability is not confined only to the approximate equality of the numerical features of the forces and weapons of the sides. Other indicators of the nuclear forces of the powers must be taken into account, as well as their military doctrines and their strategic and tactical objectives. Strategic stability cannot be examined in isolation from the overall international context, especially the state of political relations between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. To a certain extent, the stability of the military-strategic balance looks different during periods of detente and periods of prolonged international tension. Strategic stability is also influenced by the existence or non-existence of acute crises.

Therefore, strategic stability represents the function of two parameters: the material, expressed primarily through the balance of nuclear power and the ability to deliver a retaliatory strike, and the political, representing a result of the international situation and the level of tension. As the level of nuclear confrontation declines,

the role of the political factor rises, and with advancement toward the complete renunciation of nuclear weapons it will more than fill the gap created by the disappearance of the stabilizing effect of the potential for mutual nuclear destruction.

The main way of enhancing the stability of the military-strategic balance from the politico-psychological standpoint and the military standpoint is the limitation and substantial reduction of nuclear arms to the point of their complete elimination and the prevention of the spread of the arms race to other spheres.

At the same time, the substance of strategic stability is such that it is possible to imagine a hypothetical situation in which the stability of the military-strategic balance will be disrupted not only by the buildup of the forces of one or both sides but also by their substantial reduction—for example, if this is accompanied by the increased vulnerability of more and more of the strategic weapons and command, control, and communications systems of one or both sides. This necessitates the exceptionally careful consideration of the potential structure of forces and arms on both sides as a result of agreements on nuclear arms limitation and reduction.¹¹

It appears that the most important feature of the current strategic balance of power, in which the relative values of such factors as parity and stability do not coincide completely, consists in the following. Without committing any disruption of parity or even changing it to any considerable extent, it is possible to strive for unilateral advantages by taking countermeasures not coordinated with the other side, which has initiated the disruption of parity. The Soviet Union has had to do this throughout postwar history in the nuclear arms race that was started and constantly escalated by militarist groups in the West. In contrast to efforts to restore and maintain military-strategic parity, however, the unilateral reinforcement of strategic stability is a much more difficult matter, and sometimes it is almost impossible. This is the reason for an important feature of stability—the requirement of mutuality for its maintenance.

A recent example of this was the deployment of the American medium-range Pershing-II ballistic missiles and long-range cruise missiles in Western Europe, which began in December 1983. The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies had to respond with a group of measures, which included lifting the moratorium on the deployment of Soviet medium-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the USSR and the emplacement of longer-range operational-tactical missiles in the CSSR and GDR and of corresponding Soviet weapons in parts of the ocean near the American coastline. On 5 December 1983 it was announced at a press conference in Moscow that the Soviet weapons deployed in oceans and seas and aimed at the territory of the United States were no less effective than the American weapons deployed in Europe in terms of range, force, and **-what is most important—in terms of flight time**¹² (author's emphasis).

As a result of the measures the USSR and its allies took in response to the deployment of the new American medium-range missiles, parity was restored, but at a higher level. The stability of the military-strategic balance declined, partly because the reduced flight time of missiles to vitally important centers on both sides reduced the time for the thorough assessment and verification of information and for the careful choice of options to the critical minimum following warnings of a nuclear-missile strike.

Of course, the sides simultaneously take measures to enhance the survivability and operational speed of their command, control, and communications systems. The heightened effectiveness of offensive weapons, however, is making this increasingly difficult. An agreement on the elimination or withdrawal of the mutually threatening weapons of both sides would be a much more effective way of restoring stability. The most important element of this agreement would be the complete elimination of medium-range missiles in the European zone and several other measures, particularly the prohibition of missile submarines in regions from which SLBM's could deliver a pre-emptive strike against the other side's early warning, command, control, and communications systems. The stability of the strategic balance can be enhanced primarily through joint, negotiated and mutually acceptable measures based on a complete understanding of the nature of the contemporary military-strategic balance and the principles of securing its stability.

The attitudes of the military and government officials of the opposing sides toward the issue of military superiority, the military and political role of nuclear weapons, and the possibility of winning a nuclear war are of considerable importance in securing strategic stability.

It was not easy to reach an awareness of new realities under the conditions of a constant arms race and attempts by aggressive circles to achieve significant superiority in military and political relations. Examining this issue from the military standpoint, N.V. Ogarkov writes that in the beginning, when nuclear weapons were still few in number, they were regarded only as a means of the qualitative augmentation of the fire power of troops. Various methods were used to adapt nuclear weapons to the forms and methods of warfare of that time, especially the attainment of strategic objectives. Later the rapid quantitative growth of nuclear weapons of varying force, the development of a variety of long-range and highly accurate delivery vehicles, and their extensive use by the armed forces "led to the fundamental reassessment of the role of these weapons and changed earlier ideas about their place and significance in a war, about the methods of waging war, and even about **the possibility of fighting a war with nuclear weapons in general**"¹³ (author's emphasis).

As the collective analytical work by Soviet military experts, "Marksistsko-leninskoye ucheniye o voyne i armii" [The Marxist-Leninist Doctrine of War and the

Army], pointed out, "nuclear war cannot be equated with any other kind of war. The imperialists' reliance on this kind of warfare is not only futile but also fatal and criminal." The authors stress that "war as a means of settling intergovernmental disputes can be excluded from the life of society even today, on the condition of the absolute observance of the principles of peaceful coexistence by all states and the resolute resistance of any attempts by reactionary forces to commit aggressive actions and consolidate their results."¹⁴ The belief in the possibility of achieving military superiority is also groundless.

The unacceptability of the use of nuclear weapons and the impossibility of winning a nuclear war are constantly underscored by Soviet political and military leaders. This is stated in the new edition of the CPSU Program, adopted at the 27th CPSU Congress.

As far as the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact is concerned, the communique of a conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact states in May 1987 in Berlin declared once again "that their military doctrine is of a defensive nature and proceeds from a belief in the need to maintain the balance of military forces at the lowest possible level and the expediency of reducing military potential to a point sufficient for defense."¹⁵ The military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact states is aimed only at reliably securing the safety of the countries of the socialist community, has the goal of preventing war, both nuclear and conventional, and has no other purpose; it proceeds from the belief that the use of military means to settle any kind of dispute is impermissible under present conditions.

The defensive nature of the doctrine presupposes the corresponding strategy and tactics. As far as the balance of nuclear missiles is concerned, the defensive nature of the strategy takes the form of operational plans with an appropriate material base, intended to secure the reliable potential for a devastating retaliatory strike against any probable aggressor. At the same time, the defensive doctrine and strategy do not envisage the possibility and desirability of delivering a first strike for the purpose of winning a nuclear war, preventing a retaliatory strike by the adversary, or reducing the consequences of this strike to an acceptable level.

As a result, a significant element of Soviet military doctrine is the June 1982 pledge not to use nuclear weapons first. The concept of preventive strikes does not exist in contemporary Soviet military doctrine either.¹⁶ During the training of the Soviet armed forces, considerable attention is devoted to ways of preventing a military conflict from turning into a nuclear conflict. There are strict guidelines for the training of troops and determining the composition of weaponry, and strict control has been organized to exclude the possibility of the unauthorized launching of nuclear weapons, whether tactical or strategic.¹⁷

Besides the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China has pledged no first use of nuclear weapons. The United States and its NATO allies, France and Great Britain, have refrained from assuming a clear and unambiguous commitment of this kind. The possibility of using nuclear weapons first is postulated in the official NATO strategy. It is justified by the alleged superiority of the Warsaw Pact in conventional forces and arms.

The views of the government and military officials of the sides on the possibility of limiting the scales of nuclear war and on its "controllability" are of considerable importance in securing lasting military-strategic stability. The United States has been making plans for several decades, and quite intensively in the 1980's, for the use of nuclear weapons not only for retaliatory purposes in the event of a hypothetical attack on the United States, but also as a means of achieving military victory and political advantages. The theory of "limited nuclear war" in a military theater (in Europe) exists for the purpose of diverting nuclear strikes from the territory of the United States. In the beginning of the 1980's there was special emphasis on the possibility of fighting "limited" and "protracted" nuclear wars with the use of strategic weapons, presupposing a lengthy "sequential" exchange of nuclear strikes by the USSR and United States.

The development of these theories and the corresponding means of destruction is often substantiated by the need to make "deterrence through intimidation more credible." Their supporters assert that the intimidation of the adversary with threats of massive strikes (primarily against cities and industry) is unconvincing and ineffective as long as these strikes would signify a suicidal act because the other side would retain the potential for retaliation. For this reason, they insist on the need for strategic options and means of using nuclear weapons which would envisage primarily the destruction of military targets without the mass destruction of the population.

Even if the assertions that the theory and means of fighting a "limited nuclear war" are created only to enhance the "credibility" of deterrence are taken at face value, they are still enough in themselves to diminish the stability of the military-strategic balance. After all, this makes government and military command and control centers and a high percentage of strategic nuclear forces increasingly vulnerable and thereby diminishes, at least hypothetically, the reliability and credibility of retaliatory potential. The other side will certainly regard these measures as an attempt to commit acts of nuclear aggression with impunity or at least to reduce the force of a retaliatory strike to a level acceptable to the aggressor. And this kind of "deterrence," in turn, is seen by the opponent as nothing other than nuclear blackmail.

At the present time the theory of "limited nuclear war" has been elaborated in such detail that its very presence in the arsenal of American strategic and tactical thinking

is making the possibility of a rapid slide into a nuclear conflict more realistic. Today it also includes plans for "selective nuclear strikes" against the territory of the USSR, for "limited nuclear war" in Europe, and for the use of nuclear ammunition during the operations of the rapid deployment force in developing countries.

Soviet political thinking and military doctrine completely reject the idea of "limited nuclear war": "It would be virtually impossible to confine a nuclear war to boundaries planned in advance."¹⁸

Although the Soviet military leadership denies the possibility of limited nuclear war, it must take the actions of the other side fully into account. Soviet strategy, operational procedures, and tactics envisage the appropriate methods and means of securing reliable and credible deterrence at all of the main levels of potential conflict. Their existence is an important factor forcing the other side to refrain from the use of military force.

(To be continued)

Footnotes

1. V.V. Zhurkin, "Strategic Stability," *SShA: ekonomika, politika, ideologiya*, 1986, No 1, p 12.
2. Ye. Velikhov and A. Kokoshin, "Nuclear Weapons and the Dilemma of International Security," *MEMO*, 1985, No 4, p 34; "The Broad-Scale Antimissile System and International Security. Report of the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat," Moscow, 1986, p 5.
3. F. Engels, "Selected Military Works," Moscow, 1956, pp 17-18.
4. One exception was the Battle of Kursk, during which the highly tiered defenses of the troops of the Voronezh and Central fronts (with strong support on the Steppe Front) turned out to be impenetrable for the Wehrmacht shock troops, despite the fact that the latter were equipped with the latest heavy armored tanks, designed to break through defenses and develop tactical successes into operational victories.
5. N.V. Ogarkov, "Istoriya uchit bditelnosti" [History Teaches Vigilance], Moscow, 1985, pp 48-49.
6. R. Sagdeyev and S. Rodionov, "An Inquiry into the Strategic and Economic Implications of SDI," *MEMO*, 1986, No 5, p 20; "Strategic Stability Under the Conditions of Radical Nuclear Arms Reductions. Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat," Moscow, 1987, p 4.
7. "Voyennaya strategiya" [Military Strategy], edited by V.D. Sokolovskiy, Moscow, 1968, p 233.
8. In the 1960's a group of experts on systems analysis, working in the Defense Department under the supervision of the R. McNamara, defined the damages caused by approximately 400 warheads of megaton force as "unacceptable." Since that time this assessment has served as the point of departure for other assessments of this kind. See G.A. Trofimenko, "U.S. Military Strategy as an Instrument of Aggressive Policy," *SShA: ekonomika, politika, ideologiya*, 1985, No 1, p 7.
9. "Modernizing U.S. Strategic Offensive Forces: The Administration's Program Alternatives," Washington, 1983, pp 22-24; "Problems of the Nuclear Freeze. Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat," Moscow, 1984, pp 25-27.
10. *Pravda*, 25 September 1985.
11. "Strategic Stability Under the Conditions of Radical Nuclear Arms Reductions," p 13.
12. "Razoruzheniye—veleniye vremeni" [Disarmament—A Dictate of the Times], 3d ed., Moscow, 1984, pp 49-50, 188.
13. N.V. Ogarkov, Op. cit., p 51.
14. "Marksistsko-leninskoye ucheniye o voyne i armii," edited by D.A. Volkogonov, Moscow, 1984, p 121.
15. *Pravda*, 30 May 1987.
16. Here we should explain what several authors mean when they speak of "prevention" in contrast to "first-strike" forces. The main difference is that first-strike forces must have enough power to carry out a deliberate and planned attack with sufficient certainty that they will incur no serious damages themselves. Preventive forces in the conventional sense of the term are forces not capable of securing this result and more likely to be used to weaken and disorient an impending strike by the opponent.
17. D.F. Ustinov, "Gtvesti ugrozu yadernoy voyny" [Averting the Threat of Nuclear War], Moscow, 1982, p 6.
18. "Voyennyy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar" [Military Encyclopedic Dictionary], Moscow, 1983, p 842.

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Evaluation of Reagan Presidency

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[Article by V.A. Savelyev: "Reaganism: Preliminary Results"]

[Text] "The greatest misfortune is past fortune." It is possible that this Latin proverb does not even enter the minds of the American officials who so excitedly proclaimed the triumph of the "conservative revolution" and the return to "traditional values" at the beginning of the 1980's. Today, however, they must long for those days. We should remember how popular all of the talk about the "conservative wave," the "Republican era for the rest of the century," and the collapse of the Democratic Party and the "welfare state" was in the United States in 1981. The common political terminology today in America is different and consists of references to "Irangate," the "end of the teflon presidency," "the sluggish economy," etc.

In any case, the new opinions are connected with a discerning look at the politico-ideological phenomenon known as Reaganism. This is not merely the policy line of a single statesman, but the ideology and practice of the segment of U.S. ruling circles that broke through to the top of the power structure in 1980.

Reaganism can be discussed in the broad and narrow sense of the term. It is often identified with U.S. policy in the 1980's; this is usually a case of the broad interpretation, in which the term "Reaganism" is used to refer to the government policy reflecting the trends that were already apparent in President Carter's time. This line was engineered jointly by various segments of the ruling class and has been conducted jointly by various government institutions, primarily the President and the Congress. It is not a transitory policy, and elements of it will almost certainly outlive the Reagan Administration.

Reaganism in the narrow sense is a specific form of public administration, largely dictated by subjective considerations and brought to Washington from California by extreme rightwinger Ronald Reagan and his closest associates. With a view to this connection, Reaganism in the narrow sense could also be called the "California model." At times, Washington has been able to make use of this model quite effectively, but recently it has begun to misfire. This gives rise to several questions. Is it true that Reaganism is experiencing a crisis? If so, is it the result of temporary circumstances or is it connected with permanent elements of the two-party system in the United States, with shifting monopolist groups, and with profound changes on the international scene? Finally, how might Reaganism's changing status affect the development of Soviet-American relations?

Obviously, an understanding of the present state and future prospects of Reaganism and the separation of subjective aspects from objective ones necessitate an analysis of Reaganism's pre-history, its main distinctive features, and its current status.

As American analysts usually point out, when Reagan came to the White House, he arrived with old ideas about the world, dating back to the 1950's, and a traditionalist set of principles that had not changed for decades. In our examination of Reaganism, however, we are interested less in the politician for whom it is named, regardless of how fine or successful he might seem to some ("the communicator," "the teflon president," "the pragmatic ideologist," etc.) than in his policy line.

By the beginning of the 1970's, when it became evident that the established system of state-monopoly regulation in the United States had its limits, that some of its mechanisms had begun to break down, and that others were completely obsolete, demands for resolute changes began to be heard from the Right and, incidentally, from the Left as well. The traditional line dividing liberals from conservatives in terms of their attitudes toward the government's role in economic and social affairs had suffered considerable erosion.

The problem of control was the main issue. This was not a matter of the alchemy of governmental formulas or the game of inter-party relations, but of the ability of political forces and the power structure to find new solutions to the acute problems of contemporary capitalism. The United States' loss of economic and political influence, the energy crisis, the fierce competition in international economic relations, and the declining effectiveness of the government's social functions are underscored the immediate need for a new strategy. And whereas Marxists believe that the crisis of capitalism stems from the inherent contradictions of the capitalist system, bourgeois theorists have a different explanation for the United States' difficulties.

The rightwing ideologists who were the prevailing force in the United States at the end of the 1970's blamed all external problems on the "intrigues" of leftist and communist forces, especially Moscow, and all problems within the United States on the bankruptcy of the neoliberal methods of government regulation. As President Reagan remarked, "we were not speaking of the coming of an era of limitations or zero growth or of the need to be satisfied with the minimum. We spoke instead of incentives, possibilities, and expansion. We stressed the importance of more vigorous capital operations for the expansion and renovation of our industrial base. We did not want the government to redistribute a vanishing economic pie; we had a recipe for a bigger and better pie, big enough for all Americans to share."¹

The opinion that a new round of development calls for the "reversal of options," the rejection of the established system of regulation in favor of the further expansion of

free market relations, is commonly found in bourgeois literature. The groundlessness of this opinion in light of current events in the United States is self-evident. It is true that there is another, more common and more balanced point of view. It consists in the belief that the relaxation of government controls in favor of natural market forces is an objective process. It appears, however, that this interpretation is also an oversimplification. The choice of the neoconservative model by the ruling class in several capitalist countries in the 1970's and early 1980's was not a question of "more or less." It was an "either—or" matter, in which the alternatives were not the free market mechanism and government regulation, but different varieties of state-monopoly regulation.

Some methods of direct administration were rejected in favor of indirect leverage: fiscal policy, the militarization of the economy, etc. The model that made its appearance in the last few years is not a "free market" model or a model of "unregulated capitalism," but an updated model of state-monopoly capitalism.

There is no question that the specific situation in the United States contributed to the rise of rightwing forces under the slogans of Reaganism: the administrative weakness of the Carter Administration, its inconsistency, the failure of the Democratic Party platform to keep up with the requirements of the day, the split of the Democratic Party and, finally, the loud reactionary campaigns in connection with the hostage situation in Tehran and the events in Afghanistan. The liabilities of the Democratic Party—from the refusal to ratify the SALT-II treaty to double-digit inflation and the excessive escalation of interest rates—automatically became the assets of the groups rallying round Reagan.

Here it would be wise to recall that in the 1930's the struggle and confrontation of interests within the ruling class were colored, and quite deeply, by the fact that the laboring masses, and even the bourgeoisie to some extent, always had the alternative of socialism as a realistic development option if capitalism should prove unable to solve economic and social problems. The existence of this alternative, regardless of the probability of its implementation, was an important factor the elite had to take into account. In the 1970's this alternative became only a theoretical concept. This was accompanied by the perceptible weakening of its influence on public thinking, which also had a substantial effect on the ideological atmosphere and the alignment of forces in the United States and also contributed to the triumph of Reaganism.

The slower development of the socialist system was apparently one of the external factors influencing Western politics. Whereas in the 1930's the USSR's success in eliminating unemployment and poverty, establishing the principles of equality, introducing social legislation, and solving the problems of industrialization at a time of

economic crisis in the capitalist world made a tremendous impression on the laboring masses, in the 1970's the examples and slogans of the socialist community had lost much of their earlier appeal.

The influence of the left wing of the ideological spectrum in the West was also diminished by ideological disagreements in the communist movement, the loss of influence by communist parties in several West European countries, and the sluggish development of creative Marxist thinking.

The developing countries' potential for positive ideological influence also declined at that time. The political cataclysms and economic and social chaos in many of them, the destruction of traditional structures there, and the obviously unsuccessful attempts to modernize these structures also provided food for the propaganda about "successful" capitalism as the only "historically verified," reliable socioeconomic system. This was accompanied by the vindication of the traditional values of bourgeois ideology, with which Reaganism armed itself, along with anticommunism, a reliance on force and diktat, and intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states.

The decline of mass democratic movements in the second half of the 1970's and the early 1980's also weakened leftist and liberal forces. The lines separating political radicalism from liberalism and even conservatism were being erased. At the same time, however, the right flank was distinguished by a tendency toward ideological consolidation. Furthermore, this consolidation was based on new ideological weapons and a new rightwing conservative program.

The Japanese economic phenomenon and the Japanese experience in regulating social relations—paternalism, loyalty to the firm, maximum labor output, and anti-unionism—played a definite role in shaping ideological premises.

The Americanization of the capitalist world, which acquired new momentum in the last decade, also had some influence. There was a slight reduction in social tension in the United States. This was not simply a matter of overcoming the "Vietnam syndrome." As a result of the reforms of the 1960's, American ruling circles were able to stabilize racial relations to some extent and take the edge off many economic problems. Internal stabilization allowed the United States to disseminate American cultural, moral, and political stereotypes throughout the capitalist world through the most diverse channels (the mass media, international organizations, and even transnational corporations). This was not simply a matter of cultural expansion—the Americanization of movies, television, and music and "informational imperialism"—but also the Americanization of the political process, distinguished by attempts to standardize political structures according to the American model. Neoconservative recipes for economic and social

regulation are being used in various countries of the capitalist system; of course, they are dictated everywhere primarily by domestic factors, but it was precisely the United States that generated the counterreforms.

In the United States the policy of neoconservative counterreforms, based on a rightward shift, began in California. This state became the proving ground for the "California style of politics"—an integral part of the "California model."

What are the characteristic economic, social, and political features of this model?

"Reaganomics"

In economics Reaganism primarily took the form of a move from the Atlantic coast to the Pacific in the foreign economic priorities of the United States. Since 1980, for example, the countries of the Pacific basin have surpassed the Atlantic states as the main zone of trade for the United States; Taiwan, for instance, is now ahead of Great Britain, the former mother country of the New World, in trade with the United States.²

The Reaganist economic model is distinguished by consumption with expenditures exceeding income, on credit, by means of deficit financing with external sources of funding—for example, by means of a higher dollar exchange rate or interest rate. This also entails fictitious growth and the accelerated development of the non-production sphere; furthermore, this applies not only to the "service industry" but also to the new information industry. These are some of the features of the peculiar state of the U.S. economy, often described as "overheated," because its development is based on many artificially stimulated, transitory and unstable factors.

On the one hand, there is no question that the U.S. economy improved after the crisis of 1980-1982 and that the rate of inflation, unemployment, and interest rates declined. It is also true that some people feel that this happened in spite of "Reaganomics," and not because of it. In any case, the administration took credit for this improvement.

On the other hand, unhealthy developments in the American economy in the 1970's and early 1980's—the more pronounced instability of economic growth, the increased length and severity of cyclical crises of overproduction, their close relationship to structural crises, the negative effects of monetary upheavals, and other long-term processes—were not surmounted by "Reaganomics." In fact, it was precisely under Reagan that the United States lost its position as the main international creditor and became the largest debtor in the world. According to available estimates, by 1990 the United States will owe a trillion dollars to foreign creditors.³ The burden of repaying this colossal debt (estimated by American financier F. Rohatyn at 120-150 billion dollars a year) will necessitate painful restrictions on capital

investments, consumption, and military spending. If Washington does not take measures to reverse these trends in the next few years, the combined burden of military expenditures and interest payments on the debt will complicate economic growth even more, lower the standard of living in America, and diminish its foreign political influence.

"Pathological prosperity" by means of sluggish growth is resulting in the accumulation of debts, the stagnation of labor productivity, a relatively high level of unemployment, the unhealthy instability of the monetary system, the transformation of the creditor nation into a debtor, the decline of U.S. foreign economic influence, the hypermilitarization of the federal budget with radical cuts in several social programs, and the display of obvious favoritism to California monopolies and some southern and western monopolies at the expense of the "eastern establishment." All of this is arousing the dissatisfaction of influential capitalist groups which have no direct representation in the White House but have retained some power in the Capitol and in other links of the government. They are wary of the extension of the "California" economic and social model to the entire country, not only because this is a threat to their own material interests and could violate the traditional proportions for the division of the government pie "in terms of power," but also because of the increasingly evident ineffectiveness of Reagan's policies in the United States and abroad.

The extension of Reaganism in the narrow sense (the "California model") to the entire capitalist world—in the interest of U.S. ruling circles, it goes without saying—has encountered growing resistance. There is no room for altruism and philanthropy in international economics, and although America's monopolist rivals have always relied on the stimulating role of the "American locomotive," they have no intention of putting up with the Reagan Administration's deficit financing indefinitely. In connection with this, J. Jackson, one of the possible candidates for the presidency, made the completely justifiable statement that "our industrial base should not function for a world without boundaries.... We are now witnessing a Wild West mentality [in our nation]. This was possible when the west was wide open and choices seemed unlimited, but the real world is limited."⁴

When we discuss the economic limitations of Reaganism, we certainly must consider not only such indicators as budget and trade deficits but also developmental dynamics. For example, because of the cyclical development of the capitalist economy, each month brings the United States closer to its next recession. Of course, no one is able to predict when it will begin, but the period between crises is known to have lasted 40-50 months on the average in recent decades. Therefore, time is working against Reaganism.

And after all, the 1988 elections are in sight....

Social Structure and Policy

In the United States the 1980's have been marked by changes in the social structure and in the social policy instruments employed by the bourgeoisie.

At the lowest levels of the social pyramid there was pronounced social polarization, and according to the most diverse characteristics: property, status, occupation, etc. The "new middle strata" and intelligentsia grew and the group of hired workers called "new-collar" workers by bourgeois sociologists to distinguish them from "blue-" and "white-collar" workers displayed relative growth. The polarization crossed class boundaries, uniting haves and have-nots. There was more friction (skillfully used and frequently inspired by the ruling class) between the employed population and the people living on welfare, the old and new working class, and proletarians of different nationalities. The crises of the 1970's intensified differences within the working class. The traditional proletarian blocs disintegrated, the mass base of democratic movements eroded, and the number of industries with strong unions decreased.

The intensive changes in the social structure, including the stratification of the earlier working class structure, its differentiation, the fragmentation of the labor market to an extent comparable only to the end of the last century (when the labor aristocracy emerged), and the intensification of property differences in the proletariat provided a healthy medium for rightwing populist ideas, especially the current known as fiscal neopopulism; the latter links tax cuts with cuts in government programs of social assistance. New leftist concepts of non-proletarian protest, connected with the search for so-called "alternative" patterns of social development, are also being conceived and developed in the same atmosphere.

Some trends of the late 1970's and early 1980's literally pushed ultra-rightwing forces to the front of the American political stage. These trends include the increasing popularity of rightwing neopopulism as a result of tension between the middle strata and the recipients of welfare. Another is the fragmentation of the laboring public along the lines of social status and property, in which the interests of the more fortunate clash with those of the less fortunate. The political axis of the nation moved to the right as a result of the decline of mass protest movements and the increased power of conservatives in both of the main bourgeois parties.

Liberal paternalism, which had been preached by bourgeois-reformist officials in Washington since the days of the "New Deal" and attempted to alleviate social tension, was displaced more and more by concern for the interests of property owners. The earlier guardianship of the poor, however limited it might have been, was replaced by concern for the property owners who were adding to America's wealth.

Changes in the internal structure of the grand bourgeoisie and its regional polarization also promoted Reaganism's rise. In contrast to the comparatively centralized financial systems in other developed capitalist states, Wall Street groups always had to compete with financial groups in Cleveland, Chicago, and San Francisco, and recently in Los Angeles and Houston as well. As a result, relatively new regional groups of capital could challenge the traditional financial center. The growing economic strength of the southern states in the 1970's led to the rise of the new groups that displaced the "eastern liberal establishment," connected primarily with the Rockefeller empire, in the Republican Party leadership.

The capitalist groups which threw in their lot with the "New Right" are distinguished by a prevalence of financially independent families, more vigorous anti-union activity, intolerance for social programs, plans for economic expansion in (in contrast to the "old right") the Middle East and Central America, and an interest in continuing the disproportionate redistribution of federal revenue and expenditures in favor of the south, the western states, and California.

The rise of various nouveau-riche families has increased what might be called the potential for "scandal" among the elite. The entry of politics by novices, insufficiently investigated and "illuminated" by the mass media or by contacts with long-established groups of the ruling class—the "patricians"—can lead to the exposure of all types of scandals. In this context, "Irangate" (just as "Watergate") seems to be a common event rather than an isolated phenomenon.

There are other reasons for the increasingly evident social limits of Reaganism: the exacerbation of conflicts between monopolist groups and the administration's loss of support from part of the middle strata, which are, just as the lower strata, being hurt by the cuts in federal spending on education, public health, etc.⁵ In general, it is probable that social tension is on the rise again in the United States. In addition, conservative ideological potential is being undermined. The more than 6 years of ultra-rightwing government have left their mark on society. Whereas the flaws in Washington's social policy could once be blamed on the liberal Democratic "excesses" of the 1960's and 1970's, the public is now justifiably blaming them on the Republican administration. The rise in unemployment has been accompanied by a rise in crime, drug addiction, racial intolerance, etc. All of these are now part of Reaganism's liabilities.

Reaganism's main problem, however, is the shrinking social base of conservatism among the masses and among the elite.

Conservatism

The political features of Reaganism in the narrow sense are a combination of California political practices with the traditions and institutions of ultra-rightwing Republicanism at the time of the "conservative wave" of the late 1970's and early 1980's.

The rise of Reaganism was due to a group of tendencies within the Republican Party and within the two-party system as a whole. First of all, the reins of Republican Party leadership were gradually taken over by capitalist groups with a relatively peripheral position in the past. Second, the political representatives of the "old," traditional capitalist groups began affiliating themselves more with both bourgeois parties. Therefore, this was less a matter of the transfer of power from the "Yankee financiers" of the northeast to the "cowboy capitalists" of the Sun Belt, as some American political scientists maintain, than of the creation of a new alliance of ruling groups as a result of the crisis of the traditional state-monopoly model.

These tendencies were due largely to profound changes in the structure of capitalist society, and at all levels of the structure. At the top of the social pyramid—in the ruling elite—there were shifts in the balance of power among various segments of the grand bourgeoisie. The groups connected with transnational corporations, corporations representing the new high technology industries (biotechnology, robot engineering, advanced communication systems, etc.), and business groups geared to the entertainment, leisure, and service industries grew stronger. These groups were particularly dissatisfied with the liberal statist ideology, with its ideas of government tutelage, social responsibility, and other postulates of bourgeois reformism. The mobilization of ultra-right-wing forces was promoted by political dissent within the working class and the middle strata as a result of racial, ethnic, and religious friction; the strength and militancy of the petty bourgeoisie; "divided rule" as the norm in government (in which the White House and Congress were controlled by different parties); the instability of the electorate and the higher percentage of independent voters.

Now these factors are having less of an impact in favor of Reaganism as a policy. This was confirmed, for example, when two-thirds of the Americans polled by the Yankelevich firm in February 1987 supported the reordering of Reagan's budget priorities with regard to social and military programs and even agreed to higher taxes for this purpose.

Processes of regrouping have been intense in the leading bourgeois parties in the last few years and there has been a new alignment of forces within each party. This has been reflected in ideology. Unique inter-party ideological complexes have taken shape within the confines of the traditional politico-ideological currents.

On the one hand, these changes in the social and political structure of the American society served as a bridgehead for Reaganism. On the other—and this reflects the dialectics of capitalism's contradictions—the failure to solve the country's fundamental sociopolitical problems gradually brought the political limits of Reaganism's development into focus.

The scandal connected with the White House's sale of arms to Iran and the diversion of these funds to the anti-Nicaraguan contras caused the President's popularity to decline by 21 percent literally within a single month—the sharpest decline in a month in the history of American polls evaluating presidential performance. As a result, according to a Gallup poll at the beginning of March 1987, only 40 percent of the Americans expressed approval of Reagan's performance. During the same period, the approval of Reagan's foreign policy, according to a poll conducted by the *Washington Post* and ABC News, fell to 33 percent—the lowest level since his arrival in the White House.⁶ Nevertheless, Reagan is naturally still more popular than R. Nixon was at the height of "Watergate" and just before his resignation.

Other results of polls are not filling the Reaganists with optimism either. In March 1987, 58 percent of the Americans believed that the state of the economy would deteriorate soon; it is interesting that the majority's lack of faith in economic prospects has lasted for more than half a year, in spite of the absence of obvious signs of recession. Finally, according to the same poll, the Republican Party had to yield to the Democratic Party for the first time in several years as the party "best able to solve the nation's problems," and the number of Democrats was 14 percent higher than the number of Republicans.

"Irangate" exposed the hidden springs of the Republican administration's activity and illuminated Reaganism's decline. The policy of the Reagan Administration did not withstand the test of time because it was not geared to the changing realities of a world much more complex and interdependent than the long-ago world it misses so much. When the illusions and the myth of the "great communicator" were dispelled, the same features that once seemed to make the President invulnerable suddenly turned into defects. Whereas before, the *New York Times* remarked, the President's cheerful optimism "lifted our spirits, now it resembles childish fantasy in the face of impending disaster. Whereas we once saw strength in Reagan's adamant determination to follow his conscience, we now see this as obstinacy. And what we once admired as a firm commitment to traditional values in a changing world we now see as narrow-minded dogmatism."⁷

Even before "Irangate" the state of mind in America with regard to Soviet-American relations was marked by less reliance on the stereotypes of rigid power politics. The following trends were evident in public thinking:

An increasing awareness of the importance of foreign policy in the life of Americans and growing concern about issues of war and peace;

A majority belief in the existence of parity with the USSR in strategic arms;

Weaker support for higher military spending;

Heightened interest in arms control;

Increased support for various measures to normalize relations with the USSR.

It also became clear that, in contrast to administration officials, broad segments of the American public were much more likely to associate their hope for future peace with the development of cooperation with the Soviet Union, and especially with the conclusion of arms control agreements. "Reagan, who took office as a resolute opponent of detente, unwittingly accomplished one thing: By reviving the idea of a more favorable balance of power for the United States, he strengthened support for detente,"⁸ a *Foreign Policy* article said.

Of course, the masses and the ruling elite do not feel the same way about Reagan's foreign policy. According to public opinion polls conducted at the request of the Chicago branch of the Council on Foreign Relations, the powers that be are still insisting on more vigorous U.S. intervention, including military, in various regions, are more likely to support the "Reagan doctrine," assign more priority to "defending the security of allies" and less priority to strengthening the United Nations, and are much less worried about the possibility of direct U.S. involvement in military actions in Central America. The elite is more active than the general public in its support of the administration's policy on trade and on military and economic assistance. Both ruling circles and the public, however, are inclined to assign more importance than the administration to cooperation with the Soviet Union. This, incidentally, is one of the main reasons for the White House's soft-pedaling of its confrontational rhetoric.

It turned out that Reaganism in the narrow sense was unlikely to become a long-term phenomenon in American politics, to stop the erosion of the traditional foundations of the two-party system in the United States, or to bring about the long-term reconciliation of the main groups of monopolist capital, not to mention class antagonists. Reaganism, judging by all indications, had a transitory success, temporarily uniting the interests of all strata of property owners by means of the active redistribution of income to the detriment of lower strata. Sooner or later, however, this has to be followed by mounting political instability. The events of recent months indicate that this process has begun.

Now that American monopolist groups have lost their earlier economic hegemony in the world, they are relying more and more on the military-strategic "attachment" of their Western partner-rivals. This is one of the reasons for Reaganism's characteristic reliance on force in foreign policy, its neoglobalism, its militarist Rambomania, its adventurism, and its inconsistent foreign policy line. A onesided and presumptuous approach to international issues is one of the distinctive features Reagan took from the arsenal of American imperious traditions.

The reformist period of capitalist development in the United States, in which the boundaries of bourgeois democracy are expanded and vigorous social maneuvers are carried out, is either over or has come to a temporary halt. This was the reason for the widespread illusions in American ruling circles that the United States could use military strength and nuclear superiority to stop undesirable processes in Third World countries and to direct the development of the international economy. Today these illusions are disappearing.

Other political limits on Reaganism are becoming increasingly evident. In the sphere of foreign policy these are primarily the pressure of Soviet foreign policy initiatives, disagreements with allies, failures in the use of forcible tactics in the Middle East (Lebanon) and Central America, and the scandal over the "Iran-Contra" affair. In the sphere of domestic policy they are the new alignment of party political forces and new political trends. Reaganism's position was weakened in 1986 by the replacement of "semi-divided rule," in which the Republicans controlled the Senate, with "divided rule," in which the Democrats have seized the majority in both congressional houses. Furthermore, the political axis in the United States has shifted to the center. Evidence of this can be seen in the weaker influence of ultra-right-wing forces in Congress and the defeat of Republicans in elections to state legislatures, where their influence had been growing from 1978 to 1984.

The "President's men" in the White House have never concealed their feelings about opposition legislators, referring to them as the "cowardly lions on Capitol Hill," "hogs at the trough," and so forth. These were not just words; they were expressions of definite political opinions. Ultra-rightwinger P. Buchanan, White House communications director until the beginning of 1987, made several sarcastic references to the "pygmies on Capitol Hill." Attacks of this kind were mainly an indication of the reluctance of influential members of the President's team to abide by the traditions of bourgeois democracy, and this naturally irritated broad segments of the bourgeoisie, which have no wish to dismantle institutions that have taken centuries to build and have served their class interests loyally. "Although the presidency has always been the main institution of our democracy," the bourgeois-liberal newspaper *Newsday* commented, "for some reason it is precisely our presidents and their overzealous advisers that are the first to forget what it means to live in a democracy."⁹

Therefore, there are two parallel processes here: on the one hand, the consolidation of anti-Reagan forces and, on the other, the erosion of the administration's position. The Democratic Party is now being led by a new generation of politicians, who cannot be accused of a commitment to wasteful "big government." Although many of them are trying to sound "tougher" than Reagan himself when the subject of defense comes up, some are

already aware of the possibility and even the need to draft a new, more moderate, and more realistic Democratic Party platform for the 1988 elections.

The search for alternatives is affecting domestic and foreign policy issues. It includes the limitation of shows of American military strength for the resolution of regional conflicts, a shift in emphasis from bipolar to multipolar diplomacy, the more active use of the methods of economic diplomacy, and attempts—which are still rather weak—to take a more constructive approach to dialogue with the USSR.

All of this is being accompanied by the continued undermining of Reaganism's positions: Reagan's loss of his halo of invulnerability, changes in administration and White House staff personnel, friction between executive agencies and between various segments of right-wing forces, and the fierce battles over the nomination of the President's political successor. In short, all of this has given some analysts reason to speak of the impending crisis of the presidency.

Any talk about the crisis of the extreme rightwing policy line of the U.S. leadership, however, would be premature. The Republican administration is encountering growing difficulties but they have not reached the explosive stage yet. The apparent limits of the "California model's" development do not mean that the further development of some of its elements within specific boundaries is impossible or that the policy we call Reaganism in the broad sense of the term is no longer effective, particularly in view of the willingness of some Democratic Party officials to uphold the substance, if not the slogans, of Reagan's policy line.

Therefore, the domestic and foreign policy limits on the current rightwing line of the Reagan Administration are becoming more and more distinct. By continuing to conduct its earlier policies, Reaganism (in the narrow sense) is destroying its own base and could pave the way to the White House for more moderate elements from its own Republican Party or from the Democratic Party. "American ruling circles have obviously lost their bearings at this difficult time. Aggressive international behavior, the increasing militarization of policy and thinking, and contempt for the interests of others will lead unavoidably to the moral and political isolation of American imperialism and will widen the gap between it and the rest of humanity,"¹⁰ the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th CPSU Congress says.

The results of this unrealistic policy are gradually making themselves known.

Footnotes

1. "President Reagan's Quotations," Washington, 1984, p 1.

2. M. Davis, "Prisoners of the American Dream. Politics and Economy in the History of the U.S. Working Class," New York, 1986, pp 158, 251-252.

3. M. I. Zakhmatov, "The Changing International Investment Positions of the United States," *SShA: ekonomika, politika, ideologiya*, 1986, No 5.

4. *Marxism Today*, March 1986.

5. *Time*, 30 March 1987, p 37.

6. *The Washington Post*, 11 March 1987.

7. *The New York Times*, 12 March 1987.

8. *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1987, p 45.

9. *Newsday*, 18 March 1987.

10. "Materialy XXVII syezda Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuzu" [Materials of the 27th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1986, p 20.

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History of Move To Demilitarize Indian Ocean

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[Article by G.M. Sturua: "Struggle To Limit Naval Activities in Indian Ocean"]

[Text] The Indian Ocean, the third largest on our planet, plays an important role in world politics and economics. It is also indicative that almost a third of the world's population lives in this region. It is a zone rich in minerals: Around half of the world's oil and two-thirds of the uranium, four-fifths of the gold, and almost all of the diamonds in the capitalist world are concentrated here. Intensively used sea lanes stretch across the ocean, connecting continents separated by thousands of kilometers. It is completely understandable that efforts to strengthen security in the Indian Ocean zone have become a separate and important part of the international efforts to maintain peace and stability on our planet.

Questions connected with the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean were discussed during General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev's trip to India in November 1986. In a statement on the results of the talks, the two sides supported the UN General Assembly decision to convene an international conference on the Indian Ocean without delay. The group of

proposals M.S. Gorbachev put forth to strengthen politico-military stability in the region had broad repercussions. In particular, he announced the Soviet Union's willingness to begin talks with the United States and other non-littoral countries with warships based permanently in the Indian Ocean to negotiate the substantial reduction of naval forces and activity here; to conduct talks with the United States and interested Asian countries on confidence-building measures in the military sphere for Asia and the areas adjacent to the Indian and Pacific oceans; to participate in multilateral talks by all states using the waters of the Indian Ocean to plan security safeguards for sea lanes, including the Persian Gulf and the straits of Hormuz and Malacca, and guarantees of the sovereignty of littoral countries over their natural resources; to participate in drafting a multilateral agreement on the safety of air traffic over the Indian Ocean; to take part in drafting and to sign an international convention on the prevention of terrorism in sea and air traffic.

The problem of limiting naval activity, in spite of many years of bilateral and multilateral discussion, has not been solved yet. To learn the reasons for this, we should take a look at the history of the talks on the reduction of naval activity in the region. This will also be useful in view of the experience which has been accumulated during these talks and which could be used for productive results in the future.

In 1971 a resolution on the declaration of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean,¹ in which the limitation of the naval activity of non-littoral countries in the Indian Ocean was discussed as one of the principal ways of establishing a zone of peace, was passed at the 26th session of the UN General Assembly.

The first concrete steps to execute the 1971 declaration were taken soon afterward. By a decision of the 27th session of the UN General Assembly, a special UN committee on the Indian Ocean was formed to plan ways of implementing the declaration. Two years later, in 1974, the 29th session of the UN General Assembly first raised the question (on the recommendation of the special committee) of convening an international conference on the Indian Ocean and requested littoral and continental states to begin consultations for the quickest possible organization of this conference.

The concept of the zone of peace put forth by the littoral countries of the Indian Ocean was of an essentially anti-imperialist nature, because it was directed against characteristic aspects of the policies of imperialist states in the region: their creation of conflict situations, their armed intervention, and their vigorous militarization of the region. In addition, it mentioned the "competition between the great powers" as the main destabilizing factor. In other words, the Soviet Union was assigned equal blame with the imperialist states for the escalation of tension in the Indian Ocean zone.

This statement was absolutely false: The USSR had not entered and did not intend to enter into any kind of "competition" for influence in the region or for the conquest of advantageous strategic frontiers in the region at the expense of the interests of littoral countries. In contrast to the Western powers, it has no military bases in the region and does not intend to have any here, and it also does not deploy its strategic forces in the Indian Ocean zone.

Another invalid feature of the position of the littoral states was their claim to special rights to use the Indian Ocean. Our country firmly believes that the establishment of the zone of peace should proceed in strict accordance with international law and, in particular, the principles of freedom of shipping and scientific research.

This is what motivated the USSR to abstain from the votes on the resolution declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. The Soviet Union did simultaneously declare its support for the idea of creating a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean and its willingness to decide the matter on an equal basis. The Soviet position reflected the fundamental desire of our country to eliminate the danger of war and develop relations between states in the spirit of peaceful coexistence. Besides this, it also wants the Indian Ocean not to be a region for the deployment of the nuclear forces of other countries, which would pose a threat to the southern regions of the Soviet Union.

Ever since the 32d session of the UN General Assembly the resolutions on the Indian Ocean have not contained the notorious statement about "competition" and the Soviet Union has invariably voted for them. Since 1980 the USSR has been a member of the special committee on the Indian Ocean. At committee sessions Soviet representatives have explained the USSR's position on the desirable characteristics of the zone of peace. We will not discuss the Soviet position in detail, but we will take note of the elements pertaining directly to the limitation of naval presence. First of all, as far as the boundaries of the zone are concerned, the Soviet Union announced its willingness to agree to both of the options mentioned during committee discussions. The first, narrower definition of the zone's limits stipulates that it should encompass the surface of the Indian Ocean with all of its seas, straits, and islands, the air space over the region, and coastal structures. The second is a broader definition (all of this plus the territory of littoral and continental states). Although the first option is more realistic and practical, the USSR nevertheless could accept the broader interpretation in view of its support by committee members. In the opinion of the Soviet Union, it would be best to combine the two approaches—that is, to begin with the establishment of the zone of peace within narrow limits and gradually broaden them to the points stipulated in the second definition by including new regions in the zone as conditions permit.²

The USSR believes that the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean presupposes a ban on the deployment of strategic arms (for example, it would be

impossible to send missile carrying submarines to the Indian Ocean) and the reduction of the military presence of non-littoral states to absolutely safe and agreed levels. The dismantling of foreign military bases in the region would have to be an indispensable condition.

At the summer session of the committee in 1980, the Soviet representative stressed that the reduction of military presence could be radical or sequential. If the second option were to be chosen, the first phase could be a return to the levels of military presence existing in 1977 and 1978, before the ocean became the site of a large-scale arms race. During the next phase the number, structure, and composition of the naval and airborne forces of non-littoral countries in the region could be "frozen." At this time the non-littoral states would pledge not to build new military installations in the region or enlarge old ones. The substantial reduction of the military presence of non-littoral states in the region and the complete elimination of foreign military bases would be accomplished during the final phase. The establishment of the zone of peace should not restrict the shipping and air traffic rights of non-littoral countries. Their ships and planes, however, should not threaten the security of the countries of the region when they cross the Indian Ocean and should not violate the principles of non-aggression and non-intervention.³

Throughout the 1980's the Soviet Union has been developing its program for the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean and, in particular, has supplemented it with elements related directly to the restriction of naval activity by non-littoral countries. At the spring session (in 1987) of the special committee the Soviet representatives clarified the specific group of confidence-building measures our country suggests for the Indian Ocean basin. The Soviet side proposed, for example, agreement on advance announcements of large-scale naval exercises and maneuvers by non-littoral countries in the Indian Ocean and the limitation of their number and of the number of ships and planes participating in them. The USSR proposed a ban on naval maneuvers or exercises in international straits and adjacent regions as a guarantee of maritime safety.

Obviously, other methods of curtailing the naval presence of non-littoral countries in the Indian Ocean are also possible, and the Soviet Union has never refused to discuss them in a businesslike atmosphere or to seek mutually acceptable compromises. Success will naturally require a constructive approach by all parties in the consultation process, especially the United States, which has stationed its naval forces in the zone on an unprecedented scale. In spite of its complete non-acceptance of the idea of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, Washington has refrained from opposing it openly even under the Reagan Administration, which has candidly revealed the most aggressive aspects of American politico-military strategy in its declarations and actions. The American side is taking every opportunity, however, to sabotage the actual implementation of the proposals of

countries in the region. This obstructionist behavior has been combined with the categorical refusal to join other non-littoral countries in limiting the naval presence in the Indian Ocean, although in the second half of the 1970's the United States admitted the possibility of at least stabilizing the level of presence through negotiation.

Until the 1970's the U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean was not as sizable as in, for example, the Mediterranean or the southwest Pacific. Since the beginning of the last decade, however, Washington has been engaged in the intensive buildup of military preparations in the Indian Ocean, primarily under the influence of the "oil factor," deploying carrier task forces in the zone and intensifying the construction of the military base on Diego Garcia.

Discussions of the future American military presence in this part of the world took place in an atmosphere of fierce internal political battles, during which proposals were made regarding efforts to reach an agreement with the USSR on the limitation of the military activity of both powers in the Indian Ocean.

The U.S. approach to dialogue with the USSR on the limitation of military activity in the Indian Ocean was affected by the conflict between two foreign policy concepts assigning different roles to military strength in relations with developing countries. The supporters of one concept proceeded from the belief that the United States and other Western states have sufficient resources to influence the policy of developing countries by non-military means. They insisted that the emerging states could be kept within the world capitalist system by offering them extensive economic and technical assistance and investing more Western capital in their economies while simultaneously encouraging the creation of political structures based on bourgeois democratic values. The anti-imperialist policy line of the developing countries and the exacerbation of "North-South" conflicts were seen as only a passing phase over the long range. The supporters of this concept believed that the minimization or complete elimination of the U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean would not hurt American interests greatly. At the same time, they maintained that the positive outcome of the dialogue with the USSR would: a) prevent involvement in military ventures (like the Vietnam one) undermining America's position in the world; b) discourage the growth of military expenditures; c) "prevent" the assistance of national liberation movements in the region by the Soviet Union; d) establish a channel for more accurate information about Soviet intentions in the region. In essence, this concept was the result of pragmatic considerations: Its supporters did not denounce the use of military force but did believe that large-scale presence at that time was not the most "profitable" way of securing American influence in the region.

The spokesmen for the other concept, taking advantage of the fear of the "Soviet threat," demagogically declared that it was too early to stop exerting military pressure on

the developing countries. they saw the restriction of their freedom to act in the Indian Ocean as an indisputable concession to the Soviet Union. The conclusion of an agreement, in their opinion, would allow it to "neutralize" U.S. military strength in the region by diplomatic means and would establish a dangerous international legal precedent the USSR could then use to restrict naval activity in other regions. They also said that the recording of the principle of equality in an agreement would ignore the role played by U.S. naval strength as one of the elements of the "regional military balance."

As proof of the inexpediency of limiting U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean, its opponents pointed to the ambiguous position of several littoral countries. While publicly supporting the declaration of the zone of peace, they allegedly expressed the fear, during bilateral contacts, that the reduction of U.S. military presence would escalate intraregional conflicts and contradictions and give some littoral countries an opportunity to fill the future "vacuum" with their own naval presence and assert themselves as "subregional superpowers."

Of course, the foreign policy line of the American administration in the 1970's did not fit into the framework of either of these concepts—it was more complicated and contradictory. Eventually, by the end of the decade, the interventionist line, based wholly on the arguments of the second concept, prevailed in the talks on the Indian Ocean. Inconsistencies in the approach to the talks led, however, to a situation in which the negotiations were begun by the United States but were then broken off soon afterward.

During U.S. Secretary of State C. Vance's trip to Moscow in March 1977, the Soviet and American sides agreed to start the talks on the Indian Ocean. On White House orders an interdepartmental group was formed to plan American strategy and tactics for the upcoming talks. This work was conducted in an atmosphere of severe clashes, eventually resulting in the decision that the sides should first agree to "freeze" (or stabilize) the air and naval presence in the Indian Ocean zone at the 1977 level. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff was unable to sabotage the very idea of the talks, it insisted that they be limited to the discussion of only the "freeze." It was officially announced that the United States would be willing to consider the possibility of the mutual reduction of presence during the second phase of the talks. Judging by statements by administration officials, the United States hoped to use the "freeze" agreement to secure at least the following pattern of presence: It wanted to keep three ships in the zone at all times as part of its Middle East formation and to send three task forces (two of them carrier task forces) to the region each year for 65 days each.⁴

An analysis of the American approach to the limitation of naval presence in the Indian Ocean indicates that Washington was guided by the following motives when it agreed to the talks. First of all, officials there believed

that a "freeze" on military activity in the ocean on the terms proposed by the administration would maintain what the United States perceive as its own military-strategic superiority in the zone. Besides this, it is obvious that Washington hoped to keep the Soviet Union from supporting the national liberation movement of people in the littoral countries in this way. In the second place, the Carter Administration was using its decision to start the dialogue with the USSR on these matters for propaganda purposes, especially in the developing countries.

Between June 1977 and February 1978 there were four rounds of the Soviet-American talks on the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Union agreed to conduct the talks in two phases and proposed that the first-phase agreement take into account the level of allied military presence on both sides and the existence of the military bases of the United States and its allies in the zone and in regions directly adjacent to it (for example, the largest American naval base outside the United States, Subic Bay, from which ships could reach Diego Garcia in around 5 days). Besides this, the USSR proposed that the agreement include a pledge not to send strategic forces to the zone or to create an infrastructure here for the support of their actions.⁵ The United States stubbornly refused, however, to take either the ally factor or the factor of adjacent regions into account and also insisted on the right to send large naval formations, which could include aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines, to the zone.

During congressional hearings, administration spokesmen reported that the sides had agreed on the general framework of the agreement, on most of the categories of armed forces and types of activity subject to limitation, and on the inclusion of provisions in the agreement regarding consultations during the process of the implementation of the agreement and the start of talks on mutual force reductions. The unresolved matters these spokesmen mentioned included the boundaries of the geographic region to which the agreement would apply, the methods of measuring military presence, the quantitative features of the sides' forces in the restricted zone and the scales of their activity, and the status and number of bases and other military installations.⁶

The American side objected to the extension of the terms of the agreement to the Diego Garcia base and made every attempt to complete its modernization. According to reports by American experts, the United States wanted the agreement to allow the two sides to have one base each in the region in the belief that the mythical base in Berbera was the Soviet equivalent of the American complex on Diego Garcia.⁷

The Joint Chiefs of Staff exerted considerable pressure on the administration. The statement of its chairman of 30 January 1978 advised the cessation of the talks, and this was done at the end of the February meeting on the false pretext of alleged Soviet "intervention" in the Ethiopian-Somali conflict. In this way, the Carter

Administration demonstrated the inconsistency of its position and its tendency to base its approach to the talks on purely transitory circumstances.

Taking advantage of the aggravation of relations with Iran when the American embassy was seized in 1979, the U.S. military and political leadership resolved to augment its naval presence in the Indian Ocean. One or two carrier task forces are always in the region and landing vessels with a Marine battalion on board are there for approximately 6 months each year. In this decade the naval forces of the United States and its allies has been used regularly for shows of strength in the Indian Ocean, primarily in the Persian Gulf zone. After rejecting the Soviet proposals on the reinforcement of security in the region, Washington began to fuel new conflicts there. The Reagan Administration created CENTCOM, the special command which will direct the military operations of the rapid deployment forces in the northwestern part of the region.

The policy of the Republican administration, with its characteristic willingness to resort to the use of military force against emerging states, obviously left no room for the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean and the negotiation of restrictions on military activity. Reports of a secret document were leaked to the world press, revealing some of the reasons for the administration's hostile attitude toward the possibility of declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. J. Kirkpatrick, who was then the permanent U.S. representative to the United Nations and was having a perceptible effect on the planning of American strategy in the developing world, was credited with the authorship of the document. The document says: "The State Department and the Pentagon are acting together closely on a presidential directive to neutralize the efforts of the governments of some Asian and African states to demilitarize the Indian Ocean zone. This would restrict the American military presence not only in this basin but also in the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and in several African states. Demilitarization would severely complicate the actions of the American rapid deployment force."

The USSR's appeal (of 1982) to refrain from any moves capable of complicating the situation in the Indian Ocean zone, not to send large naval units there, not to conduct military exercises, and not to enlarge or modernize the military bases of the non-littoral states having such bases in the Indian Ocean basin remained unanswered for the same reasons.

It is significant that the scales of the USSR's military presence in the Indian Ocean have undergone almost no changes in several years. They represent only a fraction of the scales of the American military presence. The Soviet naval ships in the ocean have fundamentally different characteristics than the U.S. naval forces there; the ships of the USSR Navy in the Indian Ocean have no weapons to deliver strikes at targets on land.⁸

After the bilateral talks had come to a halt, the limitation of military activity in the Indian Ocean region was discussed only within the framework of the special UN committee preparing for the international conference. In the spirit of the "Kirkpatrick memorandum," the Reagan Administration intensified its struggle against the efforts of many countries to turn the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace by lowering the level of military activity. Its criticism was directed against the idea of the zone of peace in the Indian Ocean in the form in which it was set forth in the 1971 declaration and the final document of the conference of littoral and continental states of the Indian Ocean basin (in 1979). The American representatives informed the special committee that this concept "is inconsistent with today's realities" and should be replaced with a new concept, specifically stating that the threat to the region comes "not from the south and from the sea, but from the north and from land." As a result the Western countries put forth the notorious "code of principles"—a vague program which actually ignored the issue of the reduction of military activity in the Indian Ocean and simultaneously guaranteed the preservation of the positions of imperialist powers in the region.

At sessions of the special committee the American representatives proposed the Indian Ocean region be defined as its basin, the natural extensions of the ocean and islands, its seabed, the territory of littoral and continental states, the air space over the ocean and littoral territories, and huge parts of the Soviet Union—the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. The United States substantiated its demand regarding the Soviet territory with the statement that the armed contingents on that territory allegedly posed a "threat" to the security of the region. In this way, attempts were made to divert the discussion of the problems of limiting the military activity of non-littoral countries in the Indian Ocean by imposing limits on how and where a sovereign state should deploy its own armed forces within its own boundaries. The "super-broad" interpretation of the zone the American representatives were defending also excluded the American bases in the Philippines, which were located only 600-700 miles away from the territory of some states of the region and were being used actively in the interventionist operations of the U.S. Navy.

In general, during the sessions of the special committee, the United States wanted to create the impression that it was the Soviet military presence in the region that was destabilizing the situation there. American diplomats either believed that others could not think clearly or were counting on lapses of memory when they asserted that the "military presence of all other states not belonging to the region contributes to its security and protects the clear and legitimate interests of regional states and the international community."⁹ Washington administration officials had a particularly unhealthy reaction to the possibility of reducing the U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean on an equal basis with other great powers.

The American leadership intends to continue maintaining the large-scale presence of its naval ships in the ocean and to keep their sights on littoral countries. At special committee sessions, however, the American delegation stubbornly repeated that this presence "strengthens security in the region."¹⁰

Speculating on the events in Afghanistan, the United States implied that the presence of American naval forces in the Indian Ocean was allegedly a response to the presence of the limited USSR contingent in Afghanistan and that the international conference could not be convened until this contingent had been recalled. It is completely obvious that the deployment of U.S. naval task forces in the Indian Ocean has no connection with the assistance the Soviet Union is giving Afghanistan: They were being sent to the region earlier, in the 1960's and in the early 1970's. Furthermore, the considerable increase in the number of American naval ships in the Indian Ocean in 1979 took place a few weeks before the Soviet Union assisted Afghanistan in the defense of its borders at its request. By trying to involve the special committee in the discussion of the situation in Afghanistan, for which it had not received a mandate from the UN General Assembly, the American delegation was clearly attempting to impede the preparations for the international conference on the Indian Ocean.

After wasting so much time and energy on the discussion of issues outside the special committee's sphere of competence, the American delegation avoided the clarification of important aspects of its own position on the declaration of the Indian Ocean a nuclear-free zone. Although the United States did not officially oppose the assignment of non-nuclear status to the Indian Ocean, it did not respond to questions regarding the permissibility of the permanent emplacement of nuclear weapons in a zone of peace (the USSR believes that the permanent presence of nuclear weapons in this kind of zone should be prohibited).

The report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for fiscal year 1983, however, contained the indicative statement that any serious U.S. consideration of the idea of creating zones of peace and nuclear-free zones should take the possibility of the deployment of new submarines with Trident missiles in the Indian Ocean into account.¹¹ Washington apparently has no intention of giving up this position or of recalling its aircraft carriers from the Indian Ocean.

At a session of the special committee of the UN General Assembly on the Indian Ocean in July 1984, the American representative assured the committee that the United States supports the creation of a zone of peace in the ocean and does not intend to take any actions to the detriment of these efforts.¹² In reality, however, the international conference on the Indian Ocean has still not been held, in spite of the UN General Assembly resolutions, because of Washington's reluctance to agree to the limitation of naval activity.

The importance of holding an international conference on the Indian Ocean under UN auspices at the scheduled time in 1988 was underscored by M.S. Gorbachev when he was interviewed for the Indonesian newspaper *Merdeka*. As the Soviet leader said, however, "there is still no guarantee that it will take place. Experience has shown that as soon as some progress is evident, Washington breaks off negotiations."¹³ The time has come, however, to establish international guarantees of the security of shipping in the Indian Ocean and in its seas, straits, and gulfs. The limitation of the scales of naval exercises and maneuvers in the Pacific and Indian oceans and adjacent seas would aid in building confidence.

Footnotes

1. "UN Doc., A/Rec. 2832," 19 January 1972, pp 1-3.
2. "UN Doc., A/AC. 159/SR. 145," 8 June 1980, pp 5-6.
3. "UN Doc., A/AC. 159/L. 26/Add. 1," 21 July 1980, pp 5-6.
4. "Indian Ocean Forces Limitation and Conventional Arms Transfer Limitation. Report of the Panel on Indian Ocean Forces Limitation and Conventional Arms Transfer Limitation. U.S. House of Representatives," Washington, 1979, p 2.
5. *Pravda*, 2 April 1984.
6. "Indian Ocean Forces Limitation....," p 4.
7. *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, February 1980, p 46.
8. *Pravda*, 2 April 1984.
9. "UN Doc., A/AC. 159/SR. 132," 2 March 1981, p 4.
10. "UN Doc., A/AC. 159/SR. 216," 19 April 1983, p 8.
11. "FY 1983 Arms Control Impact Statements," Washington, 1982, p 57.
12. "UN Doc., A/AC. 159/SR. 251," 17 July 1984, p 2.
13. *Pravda*, 23 July 1987.

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U.S. Myth About 'Soviet Threat' Examined
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[Article by V.M. Berezhkov: "October, America and the Myth of the 'Soviet Threat'"]

[Text] The most noteworthy event of the 20th century, the Great October Socialist Revolution, marked the beginning of a new era in the life of mankind. The 70 years separating us from this epoch-making event do not constitute a long period in history, but they have been a time of tremendous changes, in our country and in the rest of the world. Profound changes took place in the world under the influence of the October Revolution. More than a third of mankind threw off the fetters of capitalist exploitation. A world socialist system came into being and has developed successfully. The colonial empires disappeared and dozens of sovereign states sprang up in their place.

The experience of the Soviet Union and other socialist states proved there was an alternative to the capitalist pattern of development. It proved that mankind could rid itself of some of the ailments and diseases that are still poisoning the lives of people in many countries. The exploitation of some people by others, unemployment, ethnic oppression, poverty, and illiteracy do not exist in the USSR. The Soviet individual can feel secure about the future.

All of this is in sharp contrast to the living conditions of millions of people in even the richest country in the capitalist world, the United States of America, where unprecedented luxury and extravagance exist side by side with horrifying poverty, devastation, absolute hopelessness, and lawlessness.

The Echo of October

The Great October Socialist Revolution evoked a variety of reactions abroad. Many Americans applauded the overthrow of autocracy and the establishment of worker and peasant rule in vast regions of the former tsarist empire. Along with other foreign internationalists, they opposed the efforts of internal and external counterrevolution with the militant slogan "Hands off Soviet Russia!"

The rulers of America, however, reacted to the echo of October with severe shock. The "New York sharks" were particularly frightened by the abolition of large-scale private ownership in Soviet Russia, the expropriation of plants and estates, and the distribution of land to those who worked it. The American ruling elite was equally startled by the Soviet regime's declaration of unprecedented social reforms for the good of the laboring public. American capitalism had to react to the appearance of the first socialist order in human history. It was precisely this, as Theodore Dreiser pointed out, that led to the

plans to institute a 40-hour work week, a minimum wage, and agricultural planning in the United States. "We raised the issue," Dreiser wrote, "of prohibiting child labor. Next in line are the issues of public health care, government security for the unemployed and elderly, and aid to the victims of such natural disasters as drought, floods, crop failures, and so forth.

"What is the reason for this sudden interest in socialism in a democratic country which did not differ in the least from Germany or tsarist Russia in 1914?

"What is the reason?...

"Blame it on the October Revolution."¹

In an attempt to quell the interest in the Soviet experiment, the U.S. ruling elite began to take every opportunity to denigrate the new order. A propaganda campaign was deliberately launched to discredit socialism in the American mind, to make the ideas of Marxism-Leninism seem frightening to Americans, and to cause Americans to distrust the Soviet country and fear the "Soviet threat." To some extent, the anti-Soviets were aided in their efforts by the ultra-leftist talk of "world revolution." The enemies of Soviet Russia used this in their propaganda without mentioning that these aims had been condemned by the party. At the same time, the high priests of Wall Street made more vigorous efforts to assure Americans of the "advantages" and "stability" of capitalism.

Attempts were also made to smother the new order in Russia, but neither the support Washington, London, Paris, and Tokyo gave the White Guard generals in the civil war nor direct intervention succeeded. Efforts to defame the socialist system were then resumed with redoubled energy in Washington and other imperialist capitals, and this later led to the coddling of Hitler, who had promised to "destroy Bolshevism."

The 70-year history of the Soviet country is filled with great and heroic events, even in the most difficult times. As the CPSU Central Committee's address to the Soviet people stresses, "the revolution represented an unparalleled outburst of the historic creativity of the masses, the finest hour of a triumphant people who threw off the yoke of capitalist and landlord exploitation."²

The tremendous inspiration of the first five-year plans, the selflessness and enthusiasm of the masses, and their confidence in the righteousness of the revolutionary cause turned the Soviet Union, a backward and near-devastated country, into a great industrial power in just a few years. Our people defended the freedom and independence of their motherland, defeated the first-rate military machine of Hitler's Germany, and showed the entire world their unity, their loyalty to socialism, and their faith in the leadership of the Communist Party.

Soviet Russia, the world's first workers' state, won many friends throughout the world and aroused the deepest affection. American journalists who were in Moscow during World War II and were impressed by the high morale of the Soviet people acknowledged that the main force uniting the people's will and mobilizing the people for selfless struggle against the invaders was the Communist Party.³

In official statements by U.S. leaders and in reports in the press, the Soviet Union was then referred to as nothing other than a "courageous ally." The situation changed dramatically after the victorious conclusion of the war against fascism. People in Washington saw their recent ally as the main obstacle in the way of American imperialism's hegemonic ambitions. Quick steps had to be taken to give the Soviet Union the "face of the enemy." The "cold war" was expected to do this. So-called "Soviet expansionism" was one of the main clichés of that time. It was blamed for the birth of the popular democracies in Eastern Europe that later took the road of socialist development. Later, the "hand of Moscow" was seen in every protest against colonial and neocolonial oppression and in every outburst of the national liberation struggle.

The chain of postulates outlining the "face of the enemy" in American minds was arranged in approximately this order: The American way of life is the ideal, and it therefore should be brought within the reach of each and every person; the United States should defend this way of life and similar ways of life everywhere; its establishment throughout the world is being impeded by communism—that is, primarily by the Soviet Union—and this is the meaning of the "Soviet threat"; furthermore, the USSR is the only country with the real potential to destroy the United States and is consequently an "enemy," regardless of its actual intentions. Besides this, the enemy cannot be trusted; it is senseless to negotiate agreements with the enemy; and if an agreement should nevertheless be concluded, the "enemy" will circumvent it and will cheat. Great pains were taken to conceal the possibility that the Soviet side might want to observe agreements and might have equally sound reasons not to trust the United States.

Of course, not all Americans accept this line of reasoning. There are many Americans with a realistic frame of mind and the ability to judge the situation objectively. Most Americans have precisely this view of the situation, however, and are therefore eager to believe those who denigrate the Soviet Union and its policies. What is more, when they hear something positive, many are inclined to ascribe these opinions to "secret communists." When it comes to reactionary propaganda's negative interpretations of Soviet foreign or domestic affairs, on the other hand, the more exaggerated they are, the more willing the general public is to accept them.

There is another side to the matter. When the "face of the enemy" is present in the American mind, it is easier for U.S. ruling circles to assume the role of self-styled

defenders of the so-called "free world" against the "Soviet threat" they have invented. The greatest fear in Washington is that the myth of the "Soviet threat" will be exposed, because then everyone will see that the "emperor is wearing no clothes" and that the entire matter concerns U.S. imperialism's hegemonic ambitions rather than defense.

Washington politicians need an "enemy." After all, if there were no "enemy," there would be no reason for an arms buildup. The military-industrial complex, however, requires constant multibillion-dollar injections in the military business. This is why the official documents of the Republican administration are still frightening Americans with the bugbear of communism even after the Soviet-American summit meetings and after the many Soviet peace initiatives. For example, a presidential report published this year on the "National Security Strategy of the United States" says that the Soviet Union is the most serious threat to the security of the United States.⁴ As we can see, the thesis of the "Soviet threat" is once again being advanced as the main argument in favor of the continuation of the arms race, the development of new offensive nuclear weapons systems, and the creation of a space system.

The engineers of this adventuristic policy would like to draw us into it. These hopes, however, were deservedly repulsed by M.S. Gorbachev: "We have done and will continue to do everything necessary to guarantee our security and the security of our friends and allies.... We will not, however, take a single step beyond the needs and requirements of reasonable and sufficient defense. We will not unthinkingly and automatically begin duplicating whatever imperialism tries to impose on us in the arms race."⁵

Only officials who are blinded by fear and hatred of socialism can talk about the "Soviet threat" today. It is not even worth wondering whether they believe in the anticommunist scarecrow they have created. In any case, the thesis of the "Soviet threat" still works, especially in the United States, although it is becoming increasingly difficult to impose it on others.

"The Face of the Enemy"

This was the topic of a scientific conference in San Francisco, organized by the university in Berkeley at the height of the latest outburst of anti-Soviet rhetoric in the United States, and the very theme of the conference aroused interest. There is no question that it reflected the worries of the politically active strata of American society about the unsatisfactory state of Soviet-American relations and the overall escalation of international tension.

The conference, which was attended by political scientists, philosophers, and psychologists, examined the historical origins of the "face of the enemy," tracing it from the Stone Age idea about the "enemy" neighbor to the

campaigns of the ancient conquerors, the internecine and religious wars of the Middle Ages, the wars of the 19th century, and the first and second world conflicts. In all ages the "face of the enemy" was impressed on people's minds and was endowed with the most repulsive features. A deliberate attempt was made to dehumanize an adversary and thereby sanctify a war against him and make his destruction a sacred cause. When contemporary history was discussed, the majority agreed that the popular view of the Soviet Union as the "enemy" is extremely dangerous, especially in the nuclear age. This is the reason for the irrational fears and instability in relations between the USSR and the United States and for the difficulties encountered in the search for mutually acceptable solutions to urgent problems. All of this allows the advocates of the arms race to derail the disarmament process and obtain billions in allocations for "exotic" weapons systems.

The general consensus at the conference was that the time had come to put an end to the intimidation of Americans with the "Soviet threat," to achieve mutual awareness and trust between the two powers, and to agree on sizable reductions in nuclear arms. Many of the people who attended the conference, and there were 1,500 of them in all, later came up to shake my hand and to express their appreciation for our efforts to normalize relations between the United States and the USSR. We can only hope that this increased the number of Americans who do not see the "face of the enemy" when they hear references to the Soviet Union.

The organizers of the conference arranged for a sightseeing tour of California. We visited the Jack London museum and his grave in the picturesque Valley of the Moon, toured historical points of interest, and took a ride along the Russian River, named in honor of the first settlers in California. We spent the evening in a winery, which began as the hobby of an oil industrialist and then became one of the largest American enterprises producing dry wines. There were around 200 people there. I asked why there were so many guests. My traveling companion, a professor from New York, explained:

"Most of supported Reagan and they are ready to celebrate any occasion now that he is in the White House. Besides this, a meeting with someone from the Soviet Union is something quite unusual. All that they know about you is that the Soviet Union is the enemy. Incidentally, the owner of this estate is not a bad man. I think he wants to show them that Soviet people are not frightening at all...."

At first everything went smoothly and everyone was courteous. Polite toasts were made. Then a tall and bulky man with a puffy face approached our table. He had apparently had too many cocktails and was unsteady on his feet, weaving back and forth.

"I want to say something to you," he said in a voice loud enough for everyone to hear.

The whole room was silent. Moving closer, the American said, even louder than before:

"This exchange of compliments makes me sick. We all know that the Soviets want to destroy us. We are sitting here listening to sweet talk while the Kremlin is getting ready to bomb us. This Russian does not belong here!"

I could see both anger and fear in his eyes: He saw the face of the enemy. And we had never met before. It was simply that a Soviet individual was associated in his mind with a "threat." And he was not the only one, as the applause in the room indicated. Encouraged by it, the stranger probably would have begun punching me if he had not been dragged away at a signal from the owner.

Such extreme incidents are not encountered frequently in the United States. The Soviet individual is more likely to encounter suspicion in America. And as soon as the atmosphere is relaxed, the sacramental questions are invariably asked: "Why do you want to destroy us?" "How can we trust you?"

Why does the anti-Soviet syndrome have such a tenacious hold on Americans?

Feedback

However subtle the hostile propaganda about the Soviet Union might be, it cannot be effective for long in itself. After all, empty allegations are not enough to turn millions of Americans into idiots. There has to be something creating the semblance of truth. Despite the fact that most of the American population is politically naive and uninformed, these are practical-minded people with inherent common sense. How have they fallen for the anti-Soviet bait this long?

The viability of the image of the Soviet Union as the "enemy" is connected with internal and external factors, and not only in the United States. Now that the CPSU is analyzing all of the Soviet nation's experience in depth and now that we can see the past clearly, we can focus on certain factors that were used particularly intensively by the enemies of the Soviet Union for slanderous propaganda campaigns.

There is some stagnation in our society, and difficulties and unsolved problems are accumulating. This unfavorable turn of events is not, of course, the fault of Marxism-Leninism or of socialism as a system, but of incompetence under certain historical conditions, national and international. It was no coincidence that Washington's move from detente to confrontation began in the second half of the 1970's. It was accompanied by a massive propaganda offensive. Portraying the negative developments in socialist countries as "inherent features" of socialism, imperialist propaganda tried to discredit the very idea of socialism and put Marxist-Leninist teachings in question. Analyzing that period, M.S. Gorbachev said: "Today we know and understand, Comrades, that

the concerted attacks—economic, political, psychological, and militaristic—begun by reactionary forces at the turn of the decade was dictated by, among other things, the state of our internal affairs.”⁶

The buildup of U.S. military muscle, the development of new weapons of mass destruction, the heightened aggressiveness of American imperialism, the departure from the Basic Principles of Soviet-U.S. Relations, negotiated in 1972, and the deliberate delays in the SALT-II talks all stemmed from the same motives. They reflected the attempts of U.S. ruling circles to use capitalism’s technological breakthroughs in several key fields in their own interest, to put the socialist world in a difficult position, and to create opportunities for social revenge.

In this situation the Soviet Union had to respond just as it had so many times in the past: It had to catch up with the United States in the field of the latest weapons systems and take other measures to guarantee its security. But these steps, as, for instance, in the case of the Soviet SS-20 missiles, were used by the West for the propagandistic justification of its own efforts to escalate international tension. The advocates of the arms race do not overlook our slightest moves, they misrepresent our intentions, and they even go so far as to juggle the facts and to invent obvious lies, stubbornly repeating statements about “Soviet superiority” and about the “violation of treaties” by the Soviet Union and frightening the average American with “Soviet expansion.” The spiteful anti-Soviet campaign in connection with the Afghan events has been going on for years. And just think of the hysterical commotion over the provocation the American special services engineered with the South Korean airliner!

For many years the Soviet leaders have underscored our country’s adherence to the idea of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. Moscow has announced many times that it will not use nuclear or conventional weapons first. The Soviet side has been equally energetic in declaring that nuclear war is impossible, that there can be no winners in it, and that whoever starts it will be committing suicide. The military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact states is purely defensive. All of this is called “propaganda” in the West. No opportunity has been missed, however, to quote Marshal Sokolovskiy’s remark of the mid-1960’s that capitalism would be doomed if imperialism should start a war. Although he did not say that only capitalism would be doomed, this is supposed to be evidence of the Soviet Union’s intention to win a nuclear duel. Khrushchev’s “we will bury you” is also remembered and is interpreted as evidence that the Soviet Union wanted to destroy capitalism through acts of violence, even though this statement—which was admittedly worded badly—referred only to the historical change of structures. At the same time, the Soviet leadership’s frequently repeated statement that the USSR is as much against the export of revolution as the

export of counterrevolution has been ignored. We still hear that Khrushchev and Sokolovskiy revealed the “Soviets’ real goals” and that everything else is clever camouflage.

Even the Soviet proposal of 28 February 1987 on the elimination of intermediate-range missiles in Europe originally evoked a skeptical question from influential Washington officials: Is this another propagandistic move to put President Reagan, already weakened by “Irangate,” in a difficult position?

Any excuse is used for purposes hostile to the USSR. Paul Nitze, now one of the most prominent American experts on disarmament, quite seriously asserts in the respected magazine *Foreign Affairs* that when the Soviet Union calls for a struggle for peace, it actually wants to fight a battle “to rule the world.” This is supposedly a Russian code. As a result of the changes in Russian orthography after the revolution and the elimination of the Roman letter “i” from the alphabet, the word “mir” gained two meanings, whereas it had once meant the world when it was spelled with the eliminated letter and it meant the absence of war when it was spelled with the retained letter. Now, Nitze insists, when the Russians speak of a struggle for “mir,” they are not talking about a struggle against war, but about a struggle to rule the planet. This, in Nitze’s words, is the main difficulty in disarmament talks with the Russians.⁷

The Soviet Union has made a number of specific proposals on the reduction and complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the reduction of conventional arms, and the destruction of chemical weapons, and on verification. For a year and a half the USSR observed a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests, in Reykjavik it put forth an entire program to relieve mankind of the danger of nuclear war, and it took bold steps to end the deadlock in the talks on the elimination of Soviet and American intermediate-range missiles in Europe. Some American experts, however, are still skeptical. They are saying that new weapon systems of all types should continue to be developed and built and that not all intermediate-range missiles should be eliminated. They are asking people to “not succumb to illusions or make concessions costly to the interests of the West.”⁸ Furthermore, referring once again to the “Soviet threat,” they are warning that the internal reforms in the USSR might engender an “aggressive foreign policy.”

There is no basis, however, for this kind of speculation. The Soviet concept of the new way of political thinking presupposes new approaches to domestic and foreign affairs. The scientific view of today’s world, which was set forth at the 27th CPSU Congress, is based on two important premises: first, that the world community has entered a particularly important, crucial phase of historical development, during which mankind will have to choose for the first time between life and self-destruction; second, that the search for ways of leading mankind out of this situation requires an understanding of today’s

world in all of its diversity and conflicting elements and, at the same time, its definite integrity. The urgent need to secure the vital objective of survival is arousing mankind's instinct for self-preservation and is giving the opposing social systems incentives to interact in ways conforming to the imperatives of the nuclear age.

This is the Soviet view of today's world, and it leaves no room for doubts about the real intentions and goals of the USSR.

The View from the Other World

At the 18th Congress of Soviet Trade Unions a speaker said that the supporters of the arms race are "making every effort to keep international tension alive and to preserve all of the conditions allowing for the continued portrayal of the USSR as the root of all evil and misfortune."⁹

Analyzing the changes in the international situation, the Soviet leadership has stressed that our domestic problems are related to problems that must be solved in the international arena. The Americans who come to our country still leave with a distorted view of Soviet reality because they sometimes encounter signs of bureaucratism and cases of inefficiency and indifference. Perestroika is expected to rid us of these negative phenomena.

The political prestige and international influence of the Soviet nation have been placed at the service of the struggle for peace. The better the situation is in our country, the more effective they will be. This realization is of fundamental importance because only an understanding of the connection between our conflicts at home and abroad can show us how we look to people in the other world. When M.S. Gorbachev spoke with leaders of the Communist Party of Argentina, he said: "It is extremely important for us to know how we look to our friends, because who, if not they, will tell us the whole truth, with no ulterior motives and with sincere wishes for our success."¹⁰

This important statement seems to be applicable to a broader range of people, particularly those who want to understand us and to reach a mutual understanding with us. The number of Americans who want this is increasing constantly. The common belief at one time was that our internal affairs were no one's business but our own. But if we want people to stop believing the lies about the "Soviet threat," it is important for us to know how we look to those from whom we expect this kind of insight.

We sometimes complain that Americans do not trust us, avoid contact with Soviet people, and are suspicious of us. And what about us? Now, in spite of all difficulties, exchanges between the USSR and the United States are being developed in several areas. The television space-bridges are becoming increasingly popular, Soviet cosmonauts regularly meet with American astronauts, and

the children's theater in Moscow has finally put on the play "Child of Peace," which aroused the emotions of the Washington public long ago. Werner Erhard and Associates, an educational organization, is conducting an American-Soviet lecture program in conjunction with the Znaniye Society, the California Esalen Institute is pursuing exchanges with the Soviet Sports Committee and other interested organizations, a famous American writer who lived near Leningrad for a short time gathered enough unique material for an illustrated chronicle of the restoration of the Pavlovsk Palace, etc.

But we can still remember when the USSR embassy in the United States received the first requests regarding all of these matters and we remember how difficult it was to gain the consent of any organization in Moscow to support these initiatives! Sometimes people were puzzled and asked: Why do they want all of this? Decisions on these matters were delayed for months, adding grist to the mill of suspicion.

Of course, whatever we do, professional anti-Soviets will continue using the set of propaganda techniques at their disposal: juggled or concealed facts, flagrant lies, subtle misinformation, and spiteful television mini-series like "Amerika." All of this is used to denigrate the socialist order, distort the Soviet way of life, and keep the "face of the enemy" alive in the American mind. But as the great American President Lincoln put it, you cannot fool all of the people all of the time. I repeat: To make a lie credible, it has to have a few elements of substance. And then the old question arises: What should we do about the problems and difficulties in our life? What should we do about everything our opponents make use of in their propaganda?

The only correct path—and it is the one advised by the party central committee—is the Leninist path of truth, however difficult it might be. This is the path of the strict observance of socialist morality, glasnost, the non-concealment of "inconvenient" facts, their open discussion, the public disclosure of errors, and the discovery of lessons to be learned for the future. The party teaches that this is the strength of socialism, and not its weakness. And however skillfully our opponents might speculate on our problems, difficulties, and errors, the open discussion of them in our country will knock the weapon of slander out of the hands of socialism's enemies.

At the beginning of the 1930's, however, a different style was gradually developed: We were expected to conceal facts and events our enemies could use against us, to "not feed" reactionary propaganda, and to solve all new problems and investigate negative phenomena as privately and surreptitiously as possible. As a result, the absence of the necessary information made it difficult to learn lessons from mistakes, to correct them in time, and to clear the road of everything impeding our advancement. All of this is being discussed extensively today. As far as our topic is concerned, the important questions are

how this faulty practice was viewed abroad and how it was used by socialism's enemies to maintain the belief in the "Soviet threat" in the American mind.

In general, these methods worked for some time. When there was a virtually complete monopoly on information in the USSR in the prewar years and in the first years after the war, it could have been assumed that the failure to report a certain fact or event meant that it simply did not exist. It was quite a different matter when this continued to be the practice after the rapid development of the mass media, the organization of broader exchanges, and the appearance of space technology. In essence, any event immediately becomes common knowledge and, in the absence of glasnost, it is presented to the world public in a carefully calculated form (usually hostile to the Soviet Union), and then frequently returns to our country in the same form. This has naturally had a negative effect on opinions of our country and has made it easier for our enemies to draw the "face of the enemy" and to encourage Americans to distrust and suspect the Soviet Union.

The anti-Soviet syndrome has a long history. The attempts made immediately after the October Revolution to discredit the new regime with obviously false statements, such as the lies about the "nationalization of women by the Bolsheviks," were unsuccessful in convincing even the uninformed public. Later, however, the enemies of socialism were able to find grounds for spiteful speculation in our domestic affairs.

The CPSU Central Committee's address to the Soviet people stresses that, in spite of the difficulties connected with the construction of socialism in hostile capitalist surroundings and in spite of the heavy losses of the war years and the intense labor of the postwar period, the Soviet people prevailed, without bending or breaking. "But there was also something else," the address says. "We had to pay a high price for deviations from the Leninist principles and methods of building a new society, for violations of socialist legality and the democratic standards of life in the party and the society, for voluntaristic errors, and for dogmatic thinking and behavioral inertia."¹¹

In the 1930's the bourgeois news media launched a fierce propaganda attack on socialism, partly in connection with the well-known excesses of the period of collectivization, which the initiator of accelerated rural reform himself described as "dizziness with success." This subject is still being brought up in the United States and in other capitalist countries to perpetuate fear and hostility, especially among American farmers.

The events of 1937 are a painful part of our difficult past. They did not pose a direct threat to the West, but they did leave a deep impression in the minds of many people abroad, contributing to the negative view of Soviet reality.

Anti-Soviet propaganda has also been able to impose a distorted opinion of the events of summer and fall 1939 on the majority of Americans. After all, it was precisely the Western powers that refused to conclude an agreement with the Soviet Union at that time on the repulsion of fascist aggression. London, Paris, and Washington hoped to send Hitler on a campaign against the USSR. It was only after the Soviet Government had been completely convinced of this Western tactic that it accepted Berlin's proposal of a non-aggression pact because it had no other choice. This kept the Soviet people out of war for almost 2 years, and it also established the necessary prerequisites for the subsequent formation of the coalition against Hitler. Reactionary propagandists are still distorting the history of the non-aggression pact, however, encouraging many Americans to nurture the shocking assumption that the United States and England fought World War II against Germany and...the Soviet Union! This added another black stroke to the "portrait of the enemy"!

Of course, we should not assume that all of the elements of anti-Soviet propaganda are firmly entrenched in the American public mind. It was only intended to create an overall negative view of the Soviet Union and of communism.

After the war the anti-Soviet scarecrow was taken out of mothballs again in the West. The enemies of socialism did not miss a single opportunity to use each of our false moves to denigrate the Soviet Union. They snatched at anything to feed anti-Soviet propaganda. After all, we did have the "Leningrad Affair," and the excesses of the struggle against the "gangs of homeless orphans," and the "Doctors' Plot," and the categorization of genetics and cybernetics as "bourgeois pseudo-sciences." The West also earned sizable propaganda dividends when one of Dmitriy Shostakovich's operas was described as "cacophony instead of music" in our country and when Boris Pasternak was later stigmatized for writing "Doctor Zhivago." We should also recall the strange initial timidity with which we discussed issues of human rights. There was a time when we did not report our underground nuclear tests, although seismic stations in other countries informed the world public of them. We also did not say anything about our preparations to send our satellites and astronauts into space, although the activity in our space ports was clearly visible to others. All of this also fed suspicion in the West. In short, our opponents sometimes had a basis for their propaganda.

Now that there are fewer "blank spaces" in the Soviet press, it is becoming increasingly difficult for socialism's enemies to paint the "face of the enemy." The new approaches to domestic and foreign policy in the USSR are putting our opponents on the defensive. Stereotypes such as the "Soviet military threat," "intractability in negotiations," "violations of human rights" and so forth are growing dim. At the same time, the adventurist nature of the policy of U.S. ruling circles and the groundlessness of their arrogant treatment of the rest of

the world and claims to omnipotence and impunity are becoming clearer. This is precisely why the anti-Soviet propagandists are hoping so much for deviations from the CPSU line of democratization and glasnost. Past experience tells us that it is not a simple matter to purge the human mind of beliefs that have been drummed into it for decades. Our opponents are taking advantage of the tremendous force of inertia in the mass mentality. This is why the United States and other capitalist countries can still arm themselves with the anti-Soviet bugbear.

Many changes are taking place in our country. The features that were snatched up so eagerly by the organizers of anti-Soviet campaigns are being eliminated, and outdated foreign policy assumptions are being discarded. The strong connection between perestroika in the USSR and new processes in world development is becoming more and more evident. World public opinion is undergoing increasingly perceptible changes under the influence of life in the socialist society and the Soviet foreign policy initiatives. Their implementation by the world community could bring about fundamental changes in the world situation and guarantee the survival of mankind.

The dynamism and vitality of Soviet diplomacy are having a beneficial effect in all regions of the planet. The peaceful Soviet proposals are known to millions, have aroused colossal interest, and have won the support of the broadest segments of the population of all continents. Their rejection could seriously jeopardize a political reputation. The Republican administration cannot afford to do this either. In Geneva the USSR and U.S. delegations, despite the doubts and reservations expressed in the West, are working on a draft agreement on the complete elimination of Soviet and American intermediate-range missiles and operational-tactical missiles. People everywhere are waiting for the successful conclusion of the talks. The USSR and other Warsaw Pact members have already come much more than halfway for the sake of an agreement. Valid proposals on strategic nuclear arms, chemical weapons, and conventional arms are lying on the negotiating table in front of our partners.

The new way of thinking in domestic and foreign policy is helping to create an atmosphere of trust between countries with different social systems. This is the only atmosphere in which a new edifice of international security can be built and reinforced. On the threshold of the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, the CPSU is asking its negotiating partners to throw off the fetters of the past and boldly look to the future, when conditions will exist for the peaceful life and mutually beneficial cooperation of all nations—large and small.

Footnotes

1. T. Dreiser, "Collected Works," vol 12, Moscow, 1955, p 274.

2. *Pravda*, 14 March 1987.

3. "The Road to Smolensk. American Writers and Journalists on the Soviet People's Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945," translated from English, Moscow, 1985.

4. "National Security Strategy of the United States," The White House, January 1987.

5. *Pravda*, 26 February 1987.

6. *Ibid.*

7. P. Nitze, "Living with the Soviets," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1984/85, p 368.

8. *Time*, 2 March 1987, p 24.

9. *Pravda*, 26 February 1987.

10. *Ibid.*, 4 March 1987.

11. *Ibid.*, 14 March 1987.

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Japanese-American Economic Relations Reviewed
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[Article by V.B. Spandaryan: "Bilateral Dependence (American-Japanese Economic Relations)"]

[Text] The Japanese-American trade conflicts which broke out in spring 1987 were extraordinarily acute. There are a number of reasons for the exacerbation of these conflicts, primarily the colossal and chronic U.S. deficit in trade with Japan. In the last few years the excess of Japanese exports over imports in trade with the United States has grown almost without interruption: from 7 billion dollars in 1980 to 39.5 billion in 1985. It grew another 30 percent in 1986 and reached, according to Japanese data, 51.4 billion dollars.¹ Japan accounts for almost 30 percent of the huge deficit in the American foreign trade balance, which was around 170 billion dollars in 1986!

Furthermore, the United States is particularly irritated by the fact that the development of Japanese-American trade seems to be moving in only one direction—Japan's increasing expansion in the American market. Japanese exports to the United States have displayed almost uninterrupted growth in recent years while Japan's

imports of American goods have remained approximately the same. In 1986 Japan's exports to the United States reached 80.6 billion dollars while its imports from the United States amounted to just over 29 billion dollars.

Japanese companies have not only expanded sales of their traditional export goods, such as automobiles, motorcycles, television sets, videocassette recorders, watches, optical equipment, machine tools, and rolled ferrous products, but have also been entering the forbidden spheres of American high technology. For example, U.S. imports of Japanese computers increased by 43 percent in 1986, reaching 3.4 billion dollars.

The dramatic rise in the exchange rate of the yen in relation to the dollar in 1985 and 1986 (45 percent) has not brought about any significant reduction in the physical volume of Japanese exports to the American market yet. It appears that the Japanese monopolies have no intention of losing their place in this huge market even at the risk of a lower profit margin.

At the same time, Japanese companies have taken advantage of the devaluation of the dollar to make more vigorous efforts to penetrate the production sphere by building their own enterprises in the United States, buying American firms, and establishing joint companies. Japanese banks and financial institutions are also expanding their operations in the American money market. All of this is arousing growing anxiety and dissatisfaction in the United States: "First it was stereos and automobiles. Now it is stocks and bonds."²

The U.S. demands for the liberalization of the Japanese commodity and capital markets have not produced the anticipated results, however, in spite of the Japanese Government's promises and concessions. "There is profound skepticism in Washington about Japan's willingness and ability to change its basic trade practices for the purpose of acquiring more foreign goods," *The New York Times* commented.

The United States was particularly upset by the Japanese refusal to allow American companies to submit bids for the construction of the new airport near Osaka (at a projected cost of 8 billion dollars) and the establishment of a new telecommunications system connecting Japan with Alaska.

The Japanese commercial and financial expansion has been hard to take in view of the growing difficulties of the American economy—sluggish economic growth, the accumulation of the budget and foreign trade deficits, the growth of foreign and domestic debts, etc. This atmosphere is fostering protectionist feelings in the United States, and these are primarily of an anti-Japanese nature.

In recent months the Japanese side took several measures to relieve the tension in trade relations with the United States. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry issued an urgent appeal to the 150 largest Japanese companies, accounting for 80 percent (100 billion dollars) of the value of all Japanese imports, for a dramatic increase, of 20 percent, in their purchases of foreign manufactured goods. Another "package" of measures to stimulate Japanese economic activity and domestic demand was submitted to the government, and this should also expand imports. In the same context, plans were made to purchase of foreign supercomputers for Japanese government organizations, to give foreign agricultural products and telecommunications equipment more liberal access to the Japanese market, to limit Japanese exports of semiconductors and, finally, to allow American companies to submit bids for the construction of the new Osaka airport.³

Nevertheless, the American administration ostentatiously instituted commercial sanctions just before Japanese Prime Minister Y. Nakasone's visit to the United States, thereby expressing doubts about the sincerity of the Japanese side's latest promises and exerting concerted pressure on it.

The penalties (equivalent to 100 percent of the price) apply to Japanese television sets with medium-sized screens and some types of computers and electrical instruments, the exports of which to the American market amount to a total of around 300 million dollars a year. The violation of a U.S.-Japanese semiconductor trade agreement was used as an excuse for the institution of the sanctions. The American side maintains that the Japanese were dumping these products.

This "punishment" does not seem severe in view of the tremendous volume of Japanese exports to the United States, but it is apparently intended to let the Japanese side know that the United States has lost patience with it and plans to take quick and decisive action from now on.

While the Japanese prime minister was in the United States, the U.S. House of Representatives approved a trade bill with a special amendment envisaging higher restrictions on imports from countries not taking measures to reduce "excessive" positive balances in their trade with the United States. It is clear that Japan is the main target of this amendment.

During the talks between Reagan and Nakasone in late April and early May, the Japanese-American trade conflicts abated, at least on the surface. Just as they had so many times in the past, Japanese ruling circles expressed their complete loyalty to U.S. policy and military strategy. The anti-Soviet card was also played. Nakasone ordered an investigation of the fabricated "case" involving a well-known Japanese company, Toshiba, which the CIA had provocatively accused of helping the USSR

build up its military strength. As a result, the firm was forbidden to export its products to the USSR and other socialist countries for a year.

In exchange for Reagan's vague promise to stop the decline of the dollar exchange rate, which has a perceptible effect on Japanese exports to the United States and on the Japanese economy as a whole, and to consider canceling the customs fines, Nakasone agreed to several new economic concessions, including measures to stimulate domestic demand and imports.

As Japan's *Yomiuri* newspaper reported, "the visit demonstrated the extreme complexity of the relations between the two countries. They are still founded on a politico-military alliance, but the emphasis in bilateral contacts has obviously shifted to debates on the alleviation of economic friction."

When the heads of the seven leading capitalist states met later in Venice, Reagan agreed to cancel the additional duties on Japanese color television sets. Now that Japanese companies are exporting virtually no sets of this kind to the United States, however, this is nothing more than a symbolic gesture.

When the severity and depth of Japanese-American trade conflicts are being assessed, it is wrong to examine them only from the standpoint of Japan's trade expansion in the American market and its simultaneous politico-military and economic dependence on the United States. This approach, which is still quite common, ignores the other side of the coin—the importance of the Japanese market to the United States and the intermeshing interests of American and Japanese monopolies in their domestic markets and the international market. The United States' growing interest in broader economic contacts with Japan is the objective result of the United States' gradual loss of economic leadership in the capitalist world and the increasing importance of Japan's role in the world economy.⁴

The impressively large purchases of American securities, especially treasury bonds, by Japanese financial institutions are already aiding considerably in covering the U.S. budget deficit. According to *The Economist*, for example, Japanese insurance companies have purchased from 30 to 40 percent of the American treasury bonds issued to finance the budget deficit. In all, purchases of foreign securities by Japanese banks and other financial institutions totaled 94 billion dollars just in 1986, and American treasury bonds represented around two-thirds of this total. In the journal's opinion, this has given Japan strong leverage in the "trade war" with the United States. "If the Nakasone government should want to strengthen its position in trade talks with the United States," *The Economist* remarked, "it could encourage a

couple of dozen Japanese executives of financial institutions to curb their appetite for American treasury bonds."⁵ There are also other, equally strong factors increasing the U.S. interest in Japan as an important commercial partner.

A brochure published recently by the quasi-official Japan External Trade Association⁶ cites carefully selected data attesting to Japan's importance to the U.S. economy. Despite the tendentious nature of this publication, it nevertheless provides a fairly complete assessment of the state of Japanese-American economic relations and the Japanese side's counterarguments in the debates with the United States on these matters.

The main argument is common knowledge. Japan is the second largest (after Canada) market for sales of American goods, and this is where around 12 percent of all U.S. exports are sold. The absolute volume of American exports to Japan in 1985 was 22.6 billion dollars, surpassing the volume of combined exports to Great Britain and the FRG.

Furthermore, Japan is the main foreign market for U.S. agricultural products, and this is where around 20 percent of U.S. exports are sold. The Land of the Rising Sun's share of the main American agricultural exports is quite sizable: 13 percent of the wheat, 19.9 percent of the tobacco, 23.9 percent of the chickens, 24.2 percent of the cotton, 24.9 percent of the corn, 25.5 percent of the soybeans, 27.8 percent of the raw hides, 46.8 percent of the citrus fruit, 52.9 percent of the pork, and 77.2 percent of the beef.

More than 50 percent of American exports to Japan are finished manufactured goods, and deliveries of these goods to the Japanese market have been growing steadily.

The U.S. share of Japanese imported finished manufactured goods is 97.5 percent for airplanes and spare parts, 79.8 percent for scientific and optical devices and instruments, 77.9 percent for computers, 76.7 percent for office equipment, 74.8 percent for photographic equipment and chemicals, 74.2 percent for computer chips, and 63.3 percent for medical equipment.

According to the compilers of the brochure, more than 30 percent of all Japanese exports to the United States (or 21.3 billion dollars in 1985) are connected with the business activities of American companies. For example, deliveries to the United States from Japanese affiliates of American firms amounted to 2.2 billion dollars, exports of goods produced by Japanese companies on American licenses and with American trademarks amounted to 6.6 billion dollars, and exports of components used by American manufacturers amounted to 8.2 billion. Exports of goods not manufactured at all in the United States (videocassette recorders, 35-mm cassettes, calculators, etc.) also belong to this category and amounted to 4.3 billion dollars.

Japanese-American relations in the sphere of mutual capital investments are discussed at length in the brochure.

In terms of the volume of direct capital investments in the United States, Japan ranks third after Great Britain and the Netherlands—14.8 billion dollars at the end of 1984 (25.3 billion according to the latest data for 31 March 1986). What is more, the absolute and relative volumes of Japanese investments are growing constantly.

Japanese companies, especially in the automotive and electrical equipment industries, are actively establishing industrial enterprises in the United States. They include such well-known firms as Toyota, Nissan, Honda, Mazda, Matsushita, Sony, Sanyo, Canon, Kyocera, Fujitsu, EKK, Mitsubishi, and others. In 1986 Japanese enterprises and firms in the United States employed more than 240,000 people, including 80,000 directly in industrial production. Besides this, many Americans are engaged in the sale and subsequent maintenance of Japanese goods in the United States. For example, Japanese automobiles in the American market are sold and serviced by more than 100,000 people.

Japanese companies and their branches in the United States play a significant role in American exports: They accounted for 11.4 percent of their value in 1983 (22.9 billion dollars). According to preliminary data, the figure was 24.4 billion dollars in 1986. In terms of this indicator, Japanese companies are far ahead of other foreign firms in the United States.

The direct investments of American companies in Japan are far in excess of all other overseas investments. The United States accounted for around 50 percent of the 6.2

billion dollars in foreign investments in this country (at the end of 1985). The annual flow of capital from the United States is also much greater than from other countries (see Table 1).

Table 1. Foreign Investment in Japan, in millions of dollars (Source: "Handy Facts on U.S.-Japan Economic Relations," p 18)

Countries	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
United States	149	249	432	214	385
England	30	20	25	46	58
FRG	37	18	16	20	23
France	19	15	7	6	21

Several American companies control a large share of the Japanese market in percentage terms: Schick (safety razors)—70 percent, Coca-Cola (soft drinks)—60 percent, IBM (computers)—30 percent, Xerox (duplicating machines)—23 percent, Del Monte (tomato juice)—22 percent, Kodak (film)—11 percent, etc. Branches of American corporations in Japan accounted for around 60 percent (or 34.6 billion dollars) of the total turnover of foreign firms in the Japanese market in 1983.

American-Japanese scientific, technical, and industrial cooperation is particularly noteworthy. In 1985 the number of agreements on industrial cooperation between the two countries reached 448 (an increase of 68.7 percent over the previous year), and the number of investment operations including this kind of cooperation reached 204 (see Table 2).

Table 2. Japanese-American Investment Operations (Source: "Handy Facts on U.S.-Japan Economic Relations," p 20)

	Joint development and exchange of technology	Total direct investment	Japanese investment in United States	U.S. investment in Japan	Combined total
Processing industry	343	162	143	19	505
Breakdown					
High technology	185	57	41	16	242
Electrical equipment industry	19	16	16	0	35
Machine building	38	23	22	1	61
Automobile manufacture	27	36	36	0	63
Other	74	30	28	2	104
Finances	16	12	9	3	28
Other	89	30	27	3	119
Total	448	204	179	25	652

The brochure also tries to prove that the Japanese market is as open as the markets of other developed capitalist countries. The average customs tariff is lower

in Japan than in other industrially developed capitalist countries and is around 2.5 percent (2.7 percent in the EEC countries and 3.5 percent in the United States).

Furthermore, there are no import duties in Japan on automobiles, computers, machine tools, semiconductors, television sets, radios, and communication equipment (the compilers of the brochure modestly neglect to say that these are the Japanese industries with the greatest competitive potential). As far as non-tariff restrictions (or import quotas) are concerned, Japan has them for "only" 22 agricultural products (this figure is much higher than in other industrially developed capitalist countries). The compilers also fail to mention that the procedures and formalities connected with access to the Japanese market for imported goods are much more complicated than in many other countries and that the unique nature of the multileveled distribution network in Japan makes its penetration by foreign firms extremely difficult.

The data cited in the Japanese brochure are of indisputable interest despite their tendentious nature. In any case, the latest trade war should be assessed with a view to the overall context of U.S.-Japanese relations, including the unquestionable interest of American monopolies in the Japanese market. For this reason, the harsh measures the U.S. administration has taken against imports of Japanese electronic goods should be regarded not only as a serious warning to Japan not to use its access to the U.S. market for unilateral advantages, but also, and perhaps to an even greater degree, as an emphatic demand for broader access to Japan's domestic market for American products and an appeal for no further delays in the elimination of existing obstacles.

Once again, the United States has been able to exert pressure on Japan and to gain more concessions by taking advantage of Japan's dependence on the American market. The other side of the matter, however, should not be overlooked either. The United States' military-strategic, political, and growing economic interest in Japan is also playing a part in the search for acceptable compromises. Of course, this does not mean that the deep and chronic Japanese-American economic rivalry is on the wane. On the contrary, it will become more pronounced, and the Japanese-American economic conflicts can be expected to flare up in new and even more acute forms.

Footnotes

1. *The Economist*, 4 April 1987, p 14; "Japan 1987. An International Comparison," Tokyo, April 1987, p 36.
2. *International Business Week*, 13 April 1987, p 23.
3. *Nichimen Economic Quarterly*, Spring 1987, p 8.
4. According to a forecast of the well-known Japanese Nomura Research Institute, by 1995 the U.S. share of the world GNP will decrease to 25 percent and the Japanese share will increase to 15 percent. By this time Japan will have taken the United States' place as the

leader in world exports of goods and capital. Tokyo will be just as important a world financial center as New York or London, and Japan will be ahead of the United States in terms of total overseas financial assets ("The World Economy and Financial Markets in 1995," Tokyo, 1986, p 5).

5. *The Economist*, 7 February 1987, p 14.

6. "Handy Facts on U.S.-Japan Economic Relations," Tokyo, 1986, 31 pages.

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Role of Electronics Industry in Arms Race
1803000If Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 87 (signed to press 20 Aug 87) pp 96-103

[Article by T.T. Belyayeva]

[Text] The evolution of U.S. military-technical policy has traditionally depended on the level of development and potential of military technology. The creation of the atomic bomb served as the material basis of the nuclear arms race. Today's electronics programs are increasingly likely to be compared to the Manhattan Project, and not only because of their scales but also and primarily because of their revolutionizing effects on the development of arms. Each new generation of electronic equipment introduces significant changes into the properties of weapons and establishes the prerequisites for the fundamental restructuring of the organization and command of the armed forces.

The rising military demand for electronic equipment, which was already apparent in the second half of the 1970's, reached an unprecedented level by the middle of the 1980's—20 percent of all U.S. Defense Department expenditures. Absolute military expenditures on electronics almost quintupled just between 1975 and 1985—from 11.5 billion dollars to 51.9 billion (Table 1). As far as the principal budget items of the department are concerned, in purchases of military equipment the electronic "component" represented 32 percent, and in research and development it represented 48 percent.¹ The Defense Department intends to maintain the high growth rate of allocations for electronics until the end of this decade. As a result, the proportion accounted for by electronics will grow even more—to 36 percent of all purchases and to 51 percent of all R & D—while the total military expenditures on this kind of equipment between 1980 and 1990 will exceed 500 billion dollars.

Experts from the Electronic Industries Association expect government expenditures on military electronics to increase regardless of changes in the total federal budget. The reason is that "any improvements in weapons systems and carriers and their modification will be connected...mainly with electronics."²

Table 1. U.S. Defense Department Expenditures on Electronics, in billions of dollars

Budget items	1975	1980	1985	1986*	1987**	1988**	1989**	1990**	1995**
R & D	3.5	6.4	14.7	15.2	16.0	16.7	17.6	18.1	21.0
Purchases	4.9	12.8	31.4	33.3	35.0	36.8	38.6-	39.2	41.0
Operation and maintenance	3.1	2.9	5.8	6.0	6.3	6.6	6.8	7.2-	9.0
Total	11.5	22.1	51.9	54.5	57.3	60.1	63.0-	64.5	71.0

* Estimated figures.

** Projected figures.

Source: "Electronic Market Data book," 1975, 1981, 1985.

There are several reasons for the high priority of electronics in comparison to other types of military equipment. The main one is connected with the developmental peculiarities of the industry itself, which is distinguished by the rapid incorporation of scientific and technical achievements, the constant miniaturization of products, and the rapid reduction of their costs.

Progress in electronic technology leads to the accelerated renewal of electronic products by causing them to become obsolete sooner. If progress in aviation, for example, proceeded at this speed, an airplane like the Boeing-767, to use the telling example chosen by *Electrical World* magazine, would cost 500 dollars and could fly around the world in 20 minutes on 20 liters of fuel.³ The actual rate of renewal in aviation, however, is only a fraction as high as in electronics. As a result, for example, the life cycle of the airplane is 20-30 years while that of its electronic systems ranges from a few months to 5-7 years. For this reason, the series production of military equipment is generally accompanied by the modernization of its electronic components, and this continues virtually until the airplane, ship, or submarine is no longer used by the armed forces. This is extremely convenient for Defense Department contractors because it guarantees them a constant supply of military contracts and does not make them dependent on rearming cycles.

The steady increase in the number of electronic components of military equipment is also due to the constant reduction of their size, weight, and energy requirements. The transfer to very large and very high-speed integrated circuits means a higher concentration of chip elements and, consequently, the colossal expansion of its functional possibilities. Foolproof and radiation-proof electronic components and systems are being developed with advanced technologies, primarily for the SDI program.⁴

The use of electronic components in weapons is doing much to enhance their effectiveness. The prerequisite is the production of electronics on a grand scale, which leads to the rapid reduction of overhead costs (by 25-30 percent a year). The reduction of costs and the simultaneous enhancement of functional capabilities are the reason for the high economic effectiveness of the use of

electronic devices in individual weapons systems and the armed forces as a whole. The development of fundamentally new means of warfare is highly dependent on progress in electronics—space-based systems, autonomously controlled combat robots, unmanned aircraft, radioelectronic surveillance equipment, etc. The modernization of existing weapons systems by replacing their electronic complexes is often equivalent to the development of a new generation of weapons, but more quickly and at a lower cost.

Automatic control reduces the amount of time required to start up the system and to find and eliminate defects. Complex space rocket systems and other systems are equipped with control devices and with reserve subsystems and complexes, and the switch to them is made automatically.⁵ The principles of the construction of completely autonomous, self-guided systems could provide new momentum for the exploration of extraterrestrial environments not conducive to human activity. The use of these systems by military agencies would arm them with a powerful means of extending the arms race to the depths of the world ocean and to outer space.

The Pentagon's Electronic Contractors

In addition to the military-technical reasons for the broader use of electronics in U.S. military preparations, there is the mechanism of artificial acceleration, generated by the military-industrial complex. It is using the scientific and technical potential of electronics to escalate the qualitative arms race, making this a profitable sphere of the military business.

In the fear of losing profitable contracts for the "electronic filling" of weapons systems, large military-industrial firms have launched a vigorous reorganization, which includes the establishment of enterprises specializing in electronics production, joint participation in enterprises with electronics firms, and the acquisition of divisions or even whole firms with a strong position in the market for advanced electronics.

The largest merger in the military-industrial complex led to the formation of a new military-industrial giant in 1985 when the General Electric Corporation purchased the Radio Corporation of America (RCA). By making this deal, which cost General Electric 6.3 billion dollars, the corporation hoped to strengthen its position in the

electronic industry and simultaneously raise its status among the Pentagon's electronic contractors. Immediately after the merger General Electric moved up from sixth to fourth place on the general list of Defense Department contractors and ranked third on the list of electronic contractors. Members of the U.S. business community have had differing reactions to the emergence of the new giant. The supporters of the merger maintain that this promises to be an ideal association because the strong points of each company are mutually complementary, meaning that the technological boldness of RCA will complement the financial and production strength of General Electric. It is true that the two companies have formed a convenient alliance in the sphere of advanced equipment, such as space systems, because RCA is one of the main manufacturers of satellite communications systems and General Electric is one of the leaders in software development. If the work on the SDI program should be launched on a broad scale, the new concern will have significant advantages over other competitors.

The increasing monopolization of the military market as a result of mergers of this kind has been the subject of pointed criticism, however, by its opponents. Senator H. Metzenbaum declared, for example, that "this kind of deal raises serious questions about antitrust laws and could severely restrict the competition for defense contracts. The administration should encourage the appearance of new firms in the market for military products, but mergers of this kind undermine the basis of the competitive bidding for contracts."⁶

The second largest military-industrial transaction was the acquisition of Hughes Aircraft, one of the Defense Department's strongest electronic contractors, by the General Motors concern for more than 5 billion dollars in 1985. Not long before this, General Motors acquired a leading software firm, Electronic Data Systems, for 2.5 billion dollars. These acquisitions were part of the concern's long-range program of development, envisaging the creation of a widely diversified structure encompassing new technological fields. General Motors executives believe that this kind of reorganization will make their military and space products more competitive and will raise the concern's status among Defense Department contractors (in 1985 it ranked 1st among the department's electronic contractors and 17th on the general list of contractors, while the respective figures in 1984 were 15th and 23d).

There have been smaller transactions for the same purpose: The traditional defense contractors are trying to penetrate the market for military systems based on advanced electronic technology as quickly as possible. Westinghouse Electric acquired the Triad Systems corporation, which is known for its development projects in space communications and was a contractor of the Navy and the U.S. Department of the Army for several years. McDonnell Douglas, the concern at the top of the list of contractors, is also using reorganization, the creation of a new department of informational systems, and the acquisition of the Time Share and Computer Sharing firms (at a total cost of 380 million dollars) to raise the tactical level of its rockets and aircraft and to diversify its production in the new technological fields, primarily high-speed computers and software. This policy of transferring experience and expanding production is within the means of only large corporations, and this will lead eventually to the further concentration of military contracts among a relatively small group of contractors.

The 10 largest suppliers of military electronics account for 63.5 percent of all Defense Department contracts for the development and production of this kind of equipment, although, as Table 2 indicates, the majority do not specialize in electronics production. For many years these firms have been part of the nucleus of the military-industrial complex and have absorbed most of the funds allocated for military programs. The monopolization of the arms market is made easier by the current practice of distributing military contracts on the basis of negotiations with a few steady contractors or of awarding contracts directly to a specific firm at the discretion of the Defense Department. This practice gives corporations considerable influence over the product assortment and allows them to set prices arbitrarily. This creates extensive opportunities to overstate actual costs. According to the estimates of Ruttenberg, Kilgallon & Associates, a U.S. consulting firm, production cost overcharges amount to around 16 billion dollars a year, but the estimate of Defense Department auditors is even higher—23 billion dollars⁷—or a third of all department expenditures on materiel purchases. In some cases the corporation's stated production costs include overhead expenses having no connection with the production process and even bribes paid to government officials. To put an end to these practices, Congress plans to pass a law restricting the number of overhead expenses included in the contracted price to 14 items, but at least 10 of them have already been called questionable.

Table 2. Main Electronic Contractors of U.S. Defense Department (according to data for 1985)

Company	Specialization	Military electronics sales volume, in billions of dollars	Percentage of military electronics in total sales	Position on general list of Defense Department contractors
General Motors and Hughes Aircraft	Radar, communications equipment	6.5	6	17
Lockheed	Missile systems	5.0	52	6
General Electric and RCA	Radar, satellites, communications equipment	3.8	10	4
Raytheon	Radar, antisubmarine defense	3.3	52	9
Sperry	Antisubmarine defense, fire control	2.2	38	16
Litton Industries	Navigation systems, radio electronics	1.9	41	19
Honeywell	Aerospace systems, electronic optics	1.9	29	14
Texas Instruments	Control, communications, navigation systems	1.6	32	21
IBM	Computers	1.6	3	15
Rockwell International	Control, communications, data processing systems	1.5	13	3
Boeing	Flight radar, fire control systems, antisatellite systems	1.4	11	5
Martin Marietta	Aerospace systems	1.4	32	11
ITT	Communications equipment	1.4	12	20
Westinghouse Electric	Radar, control systems, radio electronics	1.4	13	12
Teledyne	Radar, antennas, sensors	1.3	40	35

Source: *Electronic Business*, 15 August 1986, pp 68-69; *Defense Daily*, 3 March 1986, p7.

Another common method of earning extra profits is the lowering of the qualitative features of products. According to official Defense Department spokesmen, defects and poor quality absorb from 10 to 30 percent of annual expenditures on weapons and from 60 to 70 percent of all Defense Department expenditures on the purchase of electronic equipment.⁸

Extra profits of this kind have been made possible by the increasing complexity of weapons systems and the convoluted bureaucratic accounting system. Besides this, the large scales of subcontracted work complicate the verification of invoices and the discovery of violations: Subcontracted work now accounts for approximately half of the cost of modern weapons systems. In just 3 years (1983-1985) the Defense Department discovered 48,000 abuses.⁹ The report of the chief department auditor says that only two-thirds of all the discovered violations were investigated, and contractors were found guilty in 25 percent of the cases. The fines they paid, however, were largely symbolic, averaging only around 2,000 dollars.¹⁰ This display of Pentagon loyalty to the military-industrial corporations is a reliable guarantee of superprofits.

An analysis of the distribution of defense contracts indicates that the Pentagon's leading contractors also

receive the majority of contracts for research and development. Of the 1,900 industrial firms, laboratories, universities, and other organizations receiving funds for military R & D, the top 500, which are primarily large firms, are awarded 98 percent of all contracts, and the top 10 are awarded 50 percent.¹¹ In addition to enjoying the common privileges of military-industrial firms, the large electronics companies derive additional benefits from the possible "dual use" of technology, because the technological similarities in the production of many types of military and civilian electronics create the prerequisites for the mass production of civilian items based on military development projects. The advantages of this practice are twofold—it raises the profit margin and reduces the firm's own R & D costs at the government's expense.

It is true that opportunities for the dual use of technology were diminished perceptibly in the 1980's. On the one hand, this was due to the slower rate of technical innovation in the military sector than in civilian industries. Whereas in the 1970's the new types of microchips on which all electronic systems are based made their appearance in the civilian marketplace after items intended for military use, since the middle of the 1980's microchips for civilian use have been produced earlier than their military counterparts. On the other hand, the

mastery of the technology of custom chips, in which the target parameters of the entire system are incorporated during the earliest stages of development, is changing the nature of electronics production in principle by connecting it more closely to the development stage and by specializing it in relation to the sphere of product use. According to U.S. Defense Department figures, 90 percent of the research projects financed by the Pentagon now have no impact on the civilian sector of industry.¹² This is changing the implications of the term "dual-purpose technology." In many cases this now means the use of civilian development projects for military purposes. Once again, however, the large firms with a strong financial and research base have the advantage because they are able to conduct the initial development of military systems with their own resources, envisage the higher requirements dictated by military standards in the manufacture of civilian products, and simultaneously solicit the services of military and civilian experts for the development of new technology.

Defense contracts play a completely different role in the operations of small and medium-sized firms, which usually function as subcontractors. The practice of the annual approval of budget allocations by programs puts these firms at a disadvantage, because reorientation to the civilian market would be too difficult for them in the event of cuts in funds. A vivid example of this was the curtailment of funds for the strategic B-1 bomber program in 1979, as a result of which many small semiconductor firms in Silicon Valley lost their contracts. Many of them could not quickly reorient their production and enter the civilian market.

Differences in the rates of renewal for military and civilian products have a significant effect on the operations of small specialized firms. The existing procedure for the approval of the technical features of products on government contracts slows down the modification and replacement of items. Besides this, the huge supply of war materiel requires spare parts and subsystems whose counterparts disappeared from the civilian market long ago. The specialization of small firms in supplies of this kind leads to their technical retardation and inhibits their development. The role of the subcontractor does not allow a firm to influence the content of the program or to adjust completion dates.

Possible Consequences of the Electronic Arms Race

The new Defense Department programs in the sphere of electronics are geared to large military-industrial corporations, which will receive most of the production contracts and R & D funds. Defense industry spokesmen expect a record rise of 15-20 percent a year in the 1980's in the profits of firms working in the field of military electronics. The high profits of defense production, however, are encouraging firms to expand the market, seek new uses for military systems, and influence military demand. As soon as the American administration made its position on the deployment of military systems in

space clear, priority was assigned to the development of the field of space electronics. The Star Wars program won widespread support among leading contractors, and they were the recipients of most of the funds allocated for this program. Although the U.S. administration is trying to portray the SDI as a research program in the field of new technology with extensive commercial potential and with the active involvement of small firms, one of the salient features of this portrayal is the distribution of 46 percent of all contracts to the Pentagon's 5 leading contractors, 31 percent to the next 18, and only 23 percent to the remaining 780.

The concentration of electronic industry resources in military projects will, in the opinion of experts, reduce the competitive potential of the industry. Despite the high rate of spending on military electronics in the 1980's, a CIA assessment published by the *New York Times* says that the American electronic industry is no longer competitive "in its present form."¹⁴ This was one of the many assessments submitted to a Defense Department science advisory commission investigating the state of affairs in the electronic industry, especially the dependence on foreign suppliers of electronic components. According to some of these assessments, if current trends should continue, the United States could become dependent on imports of many of the microchips used in weapons systems, satellites, supercomputers, and other equipment of strategic importance. The declining competitive potential of electronic components will almost certainly weaken the entire American electronic industry and inhibit its scientific and technical development. This could cause the United States to lose its position as leader in the latest types of equipment, including military.

The broad range of new possibilities offered by electronics has influenced military-strategic thinking in the United States. Back in the 1970's the Defense Department advanced the concept of automated warfare, envisaging minimal human participation in combat. The subsequent progress in electronic technology aroused a new wave of interest in automated warfare in political and military circles and gave it the features of real programs. Before President Reagan had announced his Strategic Defense Initiative, work began on the modernization of the military command, control, communications and intelligence system (C³I) for the purpose of creating a high-speed automated system of data acquisition, processing, and transmission.¹⁵ The system should encompass a broad network of observation, identification, and warning systems and recommend decisions to commanders. Human participation in the processing of information will be virtually excluded. The developers also had another assignment: The system should remain operable even under the effects of various destructive factors of nuclear weapons, including radiation, shock waves, and electromagnetic surges.

The strategic computer initiative began to be financed virtually at the same time as the SDI for the purpose of developing a new generation of computers and "artificial

intelligence" systems.¹⁶ The development of computers in this field could make computers responsible for making strategically important decisions at times of crisis and controlling all types of weapons. There is no absolute guarantee, however, of the reliability of computers, just as of any other kind of equipment. Even standby, back-up, and redundancy features cannot exclude the possibility of error.

There is also the real danger of unauthorized access to software and data banks, which could result in the provocation of military actions. In an effort to use the resources of modern computers to the maximum, government organizations and laboratories are expanding the group of users by including higher academic institutions and private firms. Although the use of certain memory zones is restricted, the user does have access to the system itself. By trial and error he could find the key to the access codes of restricted segments of the computer memory.

In the United States the idea of creating a completely automated system for the delivery of a nuclear strike without human participation is rationalized as the inevitable result of scientific and technical progress in connection with the higher speed of means of destruction, the difficulty of their detection, and the reduction of decisionmaking time. In fact, however, by developing and producing better and better electronic systems, which are so profitable for military-industrial corporations, the United States is augmenting not the reliability of its defenses but the danger of a nuclear world war.

Footnotes

1. Calculated on the basis of data from *Electronic Business*, 15 August 1986, p 65.
2. *Electronics*, 1986, No 6, p 42.
3. *Electrical World*, 1983, No 4, p 39.
4. Computers for space systems are expected to withstand radiation of up to a millirad and work dependably for 20 years. The Defense Department plans to equip all of the branches of the armed forces with computers of the new generation in the 1990's, modernizing existing equipment and adding new types (*Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 1986, No 5, p 81; No 9, p 87).
5. "Impact of Technology on Military Manpower. Requirements, Readiness and Operations. Hearings..., U.S. House of Representatives," Washington, 1981, pp 6-7.
6. *Electronics*, 1986, No 1, pp 73-74.
7. *Business Week*, 27 May 1985, pp 74-77.
8. *Defense Monitor*, 1984, No 4, p 8.

9. *Defense Daily*, 1985, vol 140, No 25, p 197.

10. *Defense Monitor*, 1984, No 4, p 8.

11. *Ibid.*, p 7.

12. *Temoignage chretien*, 12 January 1987.

13. *Electronics*, 1985, No 6, pp 30-32.

14. *The New York Times*, 6 January 1987.

15. *SShA: ekonomika, politika, ideologiya*, 1986, No 6, pp 124-127—Ed.

16. *Ibid.*, 1986, No 9, pp 112-117—Ed.

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Review of U.S. Anti-Star Wars Book

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[Review by A.I. Shaskolskiy of book "Empty Promise. The Growing Case Against Star Wars. The Union of Concerned Scientists," edited by John Tirman, Boston, Beacon Press, 1986: "A Depressing and Ruinous Venture"]

[Text] The Union of Concerned Scientists, which has existed since 1969, is one of the most prestigious social organizations in the United States. It now unites more than 100,000 members. The union actively supports arms limitation. Scientific studies of foreign and military policy issues are published under its auspices.

Its first book on the SDI, "The Fallacy of Star Wars," was published in 1984. This is one of the most authoritative collections of arguments against Reagan's nuclear-space fantasies. The work discussed in this article presents more detailed criticism of the SDI, especially the "weak links" of the program, both technical and political. The authors include members of the union and other prominent American scientists.

In the words of famous astronomer C. Sagan, the book shows "why Star Wars is tragically flawed, ruinously expensive, and endangers the security of the United States." President J. Wiesner of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology briefly summed up: "The examination of the SDI from different directions shows that it looks hopeless from all of them." The editor of the book, J. Tirman, the executive director of the Winston Foundation for World Peace, a peace organization, feels that the SDI has so many weak links that they will ultimately undo the Star Wars vision (pp xii-xiii).

One of the advantages of the executive branch, he says, is the ability to "speak with many voices," and this advantage is being used to the fullest extent by the Reagan Administration. Whereas the President assures people that the purpose of the SDI is the protection of the population, the SDI Organization¹ is concerned about "stronger deterrence." This fairly vague wording, allowing for the broadest interpretation, attests to an awareness of the impossibility of protecting cities. This kind of double-talk has allowed the President to acquire popularity as a fighter for the protection of the people from the nuclear threat and has allowed the Pentagon to entice the defense industry and Congress (p 8).

In spite of the obvious flaws in the program, J. Tirman says, the SDI Organization has invariably displayed optimism, and this has become a "key element of the official SDI ideology." The pioneering spirit, faith in the unlimited abilities of science, and a deeply ingrained feature of the American political culture—confidence in Yankee ingenuity—are stimulating the work on the SDI program. Even the name of the project—the "Strategic Defense Initiative"—indicates unlimited self-confidence and a thirst for adventure and risks (p 15). The Americans are being given the subliminal message that nothing is impossible for them. This naturally diminishes the significance of such factors as the cost of the program, strategic stability in the world, and the countermeasures of an adversary (pp 8-9).

In 1985 and 1986, the work says, skepticism about Star Wars grew as more people began assessing the SDI objectively. A survey of physicists in the United States in 1986 indicated that around 80 percent believe that any kind of space-based defense would be vulnerable to Soviet countermeasures (p 14).

"A frequently overlooked fact," J. Tirman writes, "is that the Star Wars armada must first be boosted into space and, while there, perfected, supplemented, and repaired, as the months and years roll by. If, as the experts say, several thousand satellites will have to be put in different orbits for the functioning of the SDI, this would mean 5,000 shuttle flights; they would cost 600 billion dollars. The prospect of carrying out an operation of such ultra-grandiose scales is dubious primarily because of the increasing frequency of unsuccessful launches—the 'Challenger' in January 1986, the Titan boosters in August 1985 and April 1986, and the Delta booster in May 1986" (p 21).

Tirman also speaks of the different varieties of contemporary political shamanism, in which the specter of the "Russian threat" is invoked to frighten the public. "The infusion of a strong dose of Russophobia was perhaps inevitable," he remarks (p 23). In the beginning the "Soviet threat" was advanced as the main reason to create the SDI. When General Abrahamson addressed a subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives in May 1984, he argued that the SDI would be necessary "if the Russians should break the ABM Treaty" (p 23).

The Star Wars casualty list is already being drawn up, J. Tirman says. The probable victims include the 1972 ABM treaty; the possible future treaties on the limitation and reduction of offensive arms (because the USSR will not accept reductions if they are accompanied by the buildup of American antimissile potential); the ban on tests of antisatellite weapons; the moratorium on nuclear tests (the creation of a nuclear-powered x-ray laser will require many tests). Therefore, the author concludes, Star Wars is being given preference over negotiated and verifiable arms limitation (p 32).

The SDI is beginning to hit the skids, however. The system's weak links are showing signs of stress. The people heading the program have repeatedly shifted priorities and, what is more, have proved to be incapable of managing resources efficiently. Leading specialists are more likely to refuse to participate in the SDI research, technical difficulties are no nearer resolution, and some now look even more daunting than they did at first glance (for example, the computer software requirements, the difficulty of managing the system, the vulnerability of a space-based armada to counterattack, etc.) (pp 32-33). "Last but not least, there is still a complete lack of common sense in the arguments of those who continue to support Star Wars," Tirman writes.

Chasing the dream of an impenetrable "shield," the administration solicited advice from well-known enthusiasts of the SDI, such as E. Teller, while competent scientists who were skeptical about the project were excluded from the decisionmaking process. The administration did not even keep those who worked for the Defense Department informed of its progress, and the idea of the SDI was never discussed in the White House Science Council (an advisory body made up of the nation's leading scientists) (p 35).

Therefore, "the SDI was unable to win the support of much of the scientific-technical community—i.e., the very people who were supposed to make the President's dream a reality. This is probably the most pronounced split in the scientific community since the time of the Vietnam War" (p 36).

The percentage of federal allocations used to subsidize military R & D is rising quickly: 50 percent of all R & D expenditures in fiscal year 1980, 67 percent in 1985, and 72 percent in 1986. The percentage of the GNP representing federal allocations for R & D in the civilian sector is constantly decreasing, so that the United States is now lagging behind Japan and the FRG in this respect (p 46). The "brain drain" from civilian to military research will have an unavoidable impact on the scientific level of universities and will weaken the United States' role as the leader in science and technology. "The irony is that our national security will be weakened substantially," J. Tucker notes (p 46). The Defense Department's share of university funding is increasing—from 10 percent in 1980 to 16 percent in 1983 (just as it was at the height of the aggression in Vietnam in 1969).

This is particularly true of some fields of major importance (the Pentagon finances 38 percent of all engineering research, including 82 percent of all astronautical-engineering, 56 percent of all projects in electrical engineering, and 46 percent of all computer research) (p 47). By 1984 around 14 percent of the 4 million scientists and engineers in the United States were engaged in military R & D, and a third of the engineers entering the job market between 1984 and 1987 are expected to find employment in the military sector of the economy. According to some forecasts, more than 18,000 scientists, engineers, and technicians will be working on SDI-related research in 1987 (p 50).

The extreme complexity of military technology and its highly specialized uses reduce the possibility of using the results of military research in the civilian sector. Furthermore, much of the SDI research is classified top secret, Tucker writes.

A pledge to boycott SDI-related research had been signed by the majority of scientists at 72 universities by spring 1986. It is indicative that, the more prestigious the university, the more of its scientists denounce Star Wars (73 percent at Princeton, 71 percent at Cornell, 73 percent at the University of Chicago, 60 percent at the California Institute of Technology, etc.). The boycott of Star Wars research is essentially the first national protest by scientists against a specific type of weapon in U.S. history (pp 56-57). Although universities receive only a negligible portion of the SDI budget, the "struggle for minds" in this area will have significant consequences. At the end of the 1960's the majority of universities refused to conduct secret research for the Pentagon; now the militarists are trying to break this tradition by tempting scientists with promises of billions in profits (p 60).

"Some scientists believe that the SDI in its present form will not outlive the Reagan Administration. The fact is that only the President has displayed immutable confidence in its feasibility.... From the very beginning there were persistent rumors that military circles regarded the SDI Organization as a competitor for scarce resources. In combination with the growing pressure in Congress in favor of the reduction of the federal budget deficit and of military expenditures in general, the luke-warm attitude toward the SDI on the part of many high-level officials could lead to its major reconsideration when the next administration takes office," Tucker concludes (p 60).

A frequently overlooked feature of Star Wars, says R. Zirkle, an arms analyst of the Union of Concerned Scientists and a researcher in the MIT Center for International Studies, in the chapter entitled "A Tangled Network: Command and Control for SDI," is the fact that the SDI should work as a system, and not as a group of lasers, sensors, computers, and so forth. This is precisely the source of all the questions about the vulnerability of the program (p 62). "A strategic defense must perform its mission successfully as soon as it is

activated," the author says. "There will be no time for 'learning under enemy fire.' It must perform successfully on short notice, at a time and place chosen by the opponent, and against a wide variety of attack patterns and countermeasures. It must perform its mission while under attack itself, in the unknown environment of nuclear war. In peacetime it will be necessary to verify that the system works as intended and maintains this peak condition for years. In addition, it will be necessary to ensure that the system does not fire accidentally or without proper authorization" (p 62). Problems of command, control, communication, and information have always been difficult in combat, Zirkle writes, but it is hard to imagine the scales of the catastrophe if the enemy should suddenly launch from 100,000 to 1 million warheads and decoys, which will have to be detected and destroyed instantaneously (p 76).

"Could we trust the SDI software?" This question is answered by G. Nelson and D. Redell, who have degrees in what the Americans call "computer science." The authors write that it is not enough to criticize the SDI merely from the standpoint of a physicist, a strategist, or an economist; the opinion of computer programmers must also be taken into account, and they feel that Star Wars is too complicated (p 87). Even the report of the administration's "Fletcher Commission" contains an unequivocal conclusion in the volume on the computer requirements of space-based defense: This will be a task "far more complex and difficult than any other project connected with the production of civilian or military software systems" (pp 87-88). Attempts to calculate the volume of the program for the Star Wars computers have produced the following eloquent figures. If the number of lines in the program text is taken as a rough indicator, the SDI will require, according to various estimates, from 6 million to 25 million of these, which would be equivalent to the contents of 1,000 thick volumes. In the opinion of leading American experts, it would take several thousand professionals to compile this program, and they might be able to finish it in around 20 years (pp 94-95).

The SDI will necessitate the development of artificial intelligence, and there are still too many unsolved problems in this area (pp 93-94). Finally, the impossibility of guessing the exact attack pattern the SDI will have to neutralize only adds to the uncertainty (pp 105-106). Because operational testing is impossible, these issues could never be settled with any certainty. The reliability of the system would always be in doubt, the authors of the chapter conclude (p 106).

J. Tirman and P. Didisheim, a research associate with the Union of Concerned Scientists from 1983 to 1986 and then a legislative assistant to Congressman G. Brown of California, discuss the interdependence of antisatellite weapons and the SDI. The fundamental importance of destroying missiles in the first phase of flight, or the boost phase, stems from the fact, the authors explain, that it is only within this short period of

time that unreleased warheads and "decoys" can be destroyed along with the missile. The only "line of sight" that permits boost-phase interception is from outer space, and this is why the idea of an ABM system with space-based elements was conceived (p 107). The components of the system, which will primarily be in low orbits, however, will always be visible and vulnerable, and many of the Star Wars weapons could also be used as antisatellite weapons. These, in turn, could be used to destroy the space-based elements of ABM systems. This is the lethal paradox of the SDI, the authors write, because the development of the system of antimissile defense simultaneously means the improvement of the weapons of its destruction (pp 108-109).

The space-based elements of the SDI, the authors feel, are already vulnerable to the Soviet ABM systems around Moscow (established in accordance with the protocol to the ABM Treaty), and a space mine costing 3 million dollars could destroy an SDI satellite costing from 2 to 5 billion dollars (pp 114-115). The orbits of the space-based elements of a global ABM system are easy to calculate, and the presence of satellites in direct proximity to them is not prohibited by any treaty. Many studies stress that "space mines, by their sheer simplicity, present a seemingly irresolvable threat to space-based defense" (p 116).

The very velocity (8 km per second) of the space battle station costing billions of dollars would make it possible to put it out of commission with a "cloud" of small pellets weighing a gram each, the authors write (pp 119-120). They then summarize their conclusions: "The range and efficacy of antisatellite threats seem utterly lethal to Star Wars" (p 120).

The search for means of enhancing the survivability of space-based systems has not been very productive. Researchers at the Livermore Lab estimated that even a heavier armored shield is far from the perfect solution and would necessitate the boosting of an additional million tons at a cost of a trillion dollars (pp 121-122). The replication of elements of the system would be impossible: The system is already too expensive. It can only be effective if all of its numerous elements are invulnerable. The opponent will only have to put a few satellites out of commission (p 122) to turn the SDI armada into a pile of orbiting electronic junk.

The antisatellite arms race, this unavoidable result of the work on the SDI, "will bring new and deeply provocative weapons to the superpower confrontation," the authors state (p 128).

Possible Soviet countermeasures are analyzed by a physicist who was twice a member of the White House Science Advisory Committee, R. Garwin, formerly an adviser to the Defense Department for many years and a faculty member at Columbia, Cornell, and Harvard universities.

One of the persistent illusions about Star Wars, Garwin writes, is the certainty that "only the United States is capable of technical innovation, that somehow SDI can proceed without a commensurate effort by the Soviets to defeat space-based missile defenses" (p 129).

The means of neutralizing the space-based system are plentiful: the expansion of the nuclear arsenal, the development of fast-burn boosters (40-50 seconds instead of 180-300 seconds), allowing the payload of warheads and decoys to achieve its final speed while within the shielding layers of the atmosphere, the hardening of boosters, the use of decoys in boost phase, the deployment of satellite mines near the space-based system, etc. (pp 129-130).

In the opinion of experts, Garwin says, decoys are the best weapon against the SDI, and existing technology already allows for the installation of from 100 to 1,000 decoys on the missile carrier, decoys virtually indistinguishable from the real warheads (pp 139-145). A defense system cannot destroy, for instance, a million targets while under attack, and this brings the sober analyst back to terra firma: The 1 percent of the nuclear warheads not intercepted by the defense would destroy the entire nation (p 146).

J. Dean, arms control adviser to the Union of Concerned Scientists and the head of the American delegation at the Vienna talks on the reduction of armed forces and arms in Central Europe from the very beginning of these talks, writes that the immediate and still prevailing reaction to SDI in Western Europe was the belief that its negative consequences outweighed the potential benefits (pp 161-162). This opinion stemmed from a profound belief in the need to retain the arms control negotiating mechanism and to prevent an arms race in space. "Political and public opinion in Western Europe does not consider SDI worth the collapse of American-Soviet relations," Dean summarizes. The majority of West Europeans support some level of SDI research but oppose "testing and development that would jeopardize existing or possible U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements" (p 162). Furthermore, SDI will not protect Western Europe from intermediate-range missiles, and possible Soviet countermeasures in the sphere of missile defense could depreciate the French and English "deterrence arsenal" (p 164).

At the end of 1985 FRG Defense Minister M. Woerner proposed the "European Defense Initiative"—a system of antimissile defenses designed to deal with the missiles the Star Wars system could not intercept, missiles representing what Woerner calls the principal threat to Western Europe (p 174). According to NATO experts, however, attempts to create this kind of system will lead to the appearance of similar weapons in the Warsaw Pact countries, complicating European confrontation even more, and will only increase the threat to the NATO countries (pp 174-175). A system of this kind could cost around 100 billion dollars. "Now that the European assessment of the threat of direct attack from the Soviet

Union is at an all time low, major increases in the defense budgets of European NATO countries seem excluded," the author believes (pp 175-176). "The answer to this complex of problems...can only be arms control," Dean concludes (p 177).

The SDI has deadlocked disarmament talks. This is how P. Clausen, the Union of Concerned Scientists' director of research, begins his article. He discusses the relationship between SDI and arms control (p 181).

The Pentagon's "double-entry bookkeeping" is paradoxical, Clausen writes. According to SDI officials, the deployment of their system will have to "proceed hand-in-hand with deep reductions in Soviet offensive nuclear forces" to secure its effectiveness (pp 186-187). "This is where a central contradiction of the defense transition appears," Clausen remarks. "While the shift to a defense regime assumes prior agreement to restrict offenses, the very anticipation of defenses creates new incentives for offensive expansion" (p 187). The author analyzes the Reagan Administration's attempts to find non-existent loopholes in the ABM Treaty to legalize SDI and debunks all of the illusions about the possibility that the United States can unilaterally abrogate the treaty while the USSR remains bound by all of its provisions (pp 190-193). "We cannot expect," Clausen says, "the USSR to subscribe to a reading of the treaty that is so clearly prejudicial to its own interests" (p 195). The SDI is not a way of ending the arms race between the superpowers, Clausen writes, but of shifting it to a different plane where, according to U.S. plans, "Soviet advantages would be blunted and American advantages would be maximized" (pp 183-184), which would undermine the strategic balance (p 184).

The administration's allegations of a Soviet "lead" in various exotic types of technology make the intention to break the ABM treaty seem even more absurd, Clausen reasons, because this would allow the USSR to arm itself with this technology unimpeded. It seems more likely that the administration's attempts to legalize its withdrawal from the treaty stem precisely from a belief in American superiority in this area (p 194).

The process of replacing "offensive" with "defensive" deterrents, the author writes, "will create unprecedented difficulties in the calculation and comparison of the nuclear potential of the two superpowers"—after all, indefinite and differing assessments of just offensive arms are already deadlocking talks. "The inclusion of defenses in the strategic equation would greatly compound the problem," Clausen points out (pp 196-197). The existing asymmetries in the nuclear arms of the United States and USSR would compound the difficulties (p 197).

The "defense" transition scheme falls apart under the weight of its own political and logical contradictions, the American expert says. This attempt to reconcile opposites resembles the Reagan Administration's economic plan to cut taxes, raise defense spending, and balance the budget simultaneously.

"Radical arms reductions could be carried out in a straightforward fashion without the need for a 'defense transition,'" Clausen concludes. "This process would be substantially more controllable, calculable, verifiable, and stable than an attempt to include a phase of 'defensive deterrence'" (p 202). "Space-based defense cannot be reconciled with a commitment to strategic stability, relations with our European allies, and nuclear arms control" (p 203). "What truly impedes Star Wars," the author goes on to say, "are its own inherent difficulties: its insoluble problems of battle management, software, and vulnerability; its inability to cope with unforeseeable threats; its mind-boggling costs; its absolute failure to find a justifiable rationale. The inescapable conclusion is that Star Wars is dead.... SDI is a lifeless and vacuous idea" (p 204).

Unfortunately, J. Tirman writes, "this lethal prognosis does not mean that SDI will simply fade away" (p 204). Through the not entirely selfless efforts of lobbyists, the Star Wars program has already become an integral part of the military-industrial and political establishment in the United States. "What is at stake, however, is not just the search for a graceful way to extract the nation from this embarrassing and wasteful venture, but to do so before it has wreaked havoc on arms control, superpower relations, the American economy, and other elements that historically have provided peace and prosperity" (p 205).

"A future administration will perhaps give Star Wars the unceremonious burial it deserves. Whether that is done before the Star Wars bureaucracy has hurt the nation and the world is still not clear. The weak links of the concept and program will eventually break, but will the victim be the American people?" The study by the Union of Concerned Scientists ends with this question.

Footnotes

1. Created by the Pentagon in 1984 to centralize the management of SDI research. The organization now unites 27 research programs previously conducted by different defense agencies (p 36).

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Review of GDR Book on U.S. Foreign Policy
18030001h Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 87 (signed to press 20 Aug 87) pp 113-114

[Review by S.Ye. Puzanov of book "USA—Aussenpolitik in der Gegenwart" by Claus Montag et al, Berlin, Staatsverlag der DDR, 1986, 288 pages]

[Text] This work, written by a team of researchers from the Institute of International Relations of the GDR Academy of Government and Law under the general supervision of Claus Montag, is a comprehensive study of U.S. foreign policy strategy.

Pointing out the changes in the United States' international position in the postwar period, the authors single out the two most indicative trends: the substantial increase in military preparations on the one hand and the perceptible loss of economic and political influence on the other. In their opinion, it is not surprising that these trends have coincided: "The move toward the policy of arms buildup and confrontation was primarily a reaction by Washington ruling circles to the deterioration of the foreign and domestic conditions of American imperialism's existence" (p 10). The United States is trying to restore its influence by escalating the arms race and developing new types of weapons, putting its faith in the military-technical market. The most vivid example of this policy is the Reagan Administration's announced Strategic Defense Initiative.

The economic, political, and ideological factors contributing to the current U.S. foreign policy line are analyzed in detail in the book with the aid of sound statistics. The authors regard the reliance on force as its main distinctive feature. They illustrate this with G. Shultz' remark that "diplomacy which is not backed up by strength is ineffective at best and dangerous at worst" (p 71).

Power politics can be seen in virtually all areas of U.S. foreign policy activity, and especially in relations with the USSR. The authors make note of the changes in official Washington rhetoric in the middle of the 1980's. In particular, the President repeatedly declared that the United States is not striving for military superiority. The question the authors ask—"But are these words consistent with the facts?" (p 100)—is still undecided.

In addition to analyzing U.S. military strategy and the U.S. approach to the socialist countries at length, the authors examine Washington's policy toward the developing and developed capitalist countries.

The authors reveal the essence and main causes of conflicts between the United States and other imperialist powers: In spite of their ideological unity, economic battles will continue to influence all of their interrelations considerably. To compensate for losses in this field, the United States is encouraging the West Europeans and Japanese to participate more extensively in its military programs and development projects. The promised dividends from this kind of cooperation, however, are likely to benefit only the United States. In the authors' opinion, the participation of the West Europeans in the Star Wars program, the most sweeping military program in the entire history of the development of weapons, will ultimately "attach much of the economic and technological potential of the allies more closely to the U.S. military-industrial complex" (p 219).

In general, the carefully planned methods of the team of authors must be given much of the credit for this interesting study, which could be useful to a broad range of scholars of international affairs.

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Review of Book on Business Influence on U.S. Politics

18030001i Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 9, Sep 87 (signed to press 20 Aug 87) pp 114-115

[Report by Yu.K. Abramov on book "Kto pravit Amerikoy?" [Who Rules America?] by Yu.E. Kornilov and G.A. Shishkin, Moscow, Politizdat, 1986, 335 pages]

[Text] In spite of the periodic changes in its composition, the U.S. federal government is always a spokesman for the interests of monopolist capital. This is common knowledge. The authors of this book stress, however, that the American ruling class is not stagnant or immutable. There is "a constant struggle for influence and power, for broader economic positions, and for stronger political positions" between various segments of the monopolist bourgeoisie (p 12). At the beginning of the 1980's, for example, big business in California became one of the growing power centers in American politics. Its nucleus consists of the largest American military-industrial concerns. They account for more than a fourth of all Pentagon contracts.

The authors direct special attention to the personal ties between the executives of the largest corporations and the heads of government agencies and to the role of business in the financing of political campaigns. They also examine the daily activities of the public officials of the current Republican administration. With the aid of American political statistics, they present a detailed description of the group of people performing the functions of public administration in the United States and of the main social groups from which government officials are recruited.

The abundant use of biographical information in the work is of indisputable value. The reader can learn the details of the political careers of many U.S. statesmen and the politicians working behind the scenes. They include President R. Reagan, Secretary of State G. Shultz, Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger, and many other members of the administration.

The book is written in a lively narrative style and is richly illustrated with vivid examples. Each page provides the reader with new facts about the American political elite. The extremely brief digressions into the history of various government agencies and political institutions provide even more evidence of the fact that the strong connection with the corporate community, especially its military-industrial nucleus, is characteristic not only of the current administration but of 20th-century American politics in general.

The spokesmen for different financial and industrial groups, however, are somewhat independent of the forces backing them. Their rise to the highest level of government seems to give them a temporary mandate to seek a more effective strategy of public administration from the standpoint of the common class interests of the American bourgeoisie. To this end, they can depart from the immediate and confined interests of individual companies or groups of companies.

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Appeal for More Access to U.S. Books on Management

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[Letter to editors from B.N. Porfiriev, candidate of economic sciences and senior research associate at the All-Union Institute of Systems Research, USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] Dear Editors!

For 4 months I had a chance to become acquainted with one of the bestsellers on American management, "Re-Inventing the Corporation," a book by renowned American experts J. Naisbitt and P. Aburdene. My acquaintance with this book, just as with other interesting works by American experts, was made possible by the publication of a detailed and skillfully composed digest in *SShA: ekonomika, politika, ideologiya* (No 12, 1986—No 3, 1987).

In connection with this, I would like to make note of the great benefits of the publication of translations of sound works by respected American economists, sociologists, and politicians in your journal. It is increasing the number of the journal's readers, who want to obtain information of interest to them as quickly as possible. It is no secret that it can take months or even years for you to obtain and peruse a book from a foreign publisher.

The digest of the book by J. Naisbitt and P. Aburdene focuses on the key elements of the qualitative changes in the style of management in U.S. corporations. Furthermore, there is an emphasis on matters of practical interest from the standpoint of problems in the restructuring of the administrative sphere in our country on the national level and on the level of industrial enterprises and associations.

Questions connected with the reorganization of the educational system to meet the needs of the society more completely, the new types of wages and incentives for labor, including the work of engineers and inventors, with the combination of professions and the rotation of

jobs, and with the flexible work schedule and the part-time work day are indisputably relevant to us. Of course, I am not saying that the experience of U.S. corporations should be applied automatically to our own enterprises. It is not only that our social relations are of a fundamentally different nature, but also that there is frequently no need for this: Many forms of labor organization which seem new to American managers, such as the brigade form, first made their appearance in the USSR. I think that it would be beneficial, however, to make use of the positive aspects of the experience accumulated in U.S. corporations and analyzed in the book by J. Naisbitt and P. Aburdene.

Last but not least, a qualified translation or digest of works of interest and benefit to specialists in a journal such as *SShA: ekonomika, politika, ideologiya* can serve as a point of reference for our own publishers of translated literature—Progress, Ekonomika, and others. As far as books on management are concerned, one of the latest examples was the well-known work by T. Peters and R. Waterman, "In Search of Excellence," a digest of which was published in your journal in 1985 and a translation of which was published by the Progress Publishing House (entitled "In Search of Effective Management") in 1986. The study by J. Naisbitt and P. Aburdene might also be translated in full. I must add that the same "right" can and should be extended to several works that have not been made available to the reading public yet.

In view of all this, it seems to me that translations and digests of the most important (from the theoretical and practical standpoints) works by American experts on U.S. current issues should continue to be published regularly in your journal and in other scientific and popular-science publications. Besides this, it would be important to provide, at least in the form of a short bibliography, a list of the latest published works dealing with this subject matter.

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**Articles Not Translated from SSHA:
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